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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS AP-
PLIED TO STATE AGENCIES: A SURVEY OF THE CASES AND A PROPOSED
MODEL FOR ANALYSIS.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a person institutes a suit against a state in federal court which
is otherwise within the court's jurisdiction, he is confronted with the
eleventh amendment as a potential bar to his action. The amendment
provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'
When suit is against an agency of the state, such as a regulatory com-
mission, a school district, or a social service administration, a question
arises as to the scope of the amendment's protection. If the state agency
is deemed the "arm" or "alter ego" of the state, it qualifies for the amend-
ment's protection; conversely, if it is deemed a "citizen" it is not thereby
protected. This Comment will address the question of when a state agency
is considered the "alter ego" of the state, and when it is considered a
"citizen" of the state, for eleventh amendment purposes. After a brief
examination of the history of the amendment and the structural framework
within which it operates, two methods of resolving the state agency prob-
lem will be explored: the method currently utilized by the courts, and a
suggested model based upon the historical context of the amendment.
II. HISTORY
Article III of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that "[the judicial
Power [of the United States] shall extend ...to Controversies ...be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State .... "2 In its first major
decision, Chisholm v. Georgia,3 the United States Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether this language implied that a state could be
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2. Id. art. III, § 2.
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sued in assumpsit in a federal court by a citizen of another state.4 Although
familiar with the doctrine of sovereign immunity,5 which provides that a
sovereign is not subject to suit without its consent,6 the Court held that
a state could be sued in a federal court by a citizen of another state.7 In
reaction to this decision, the eleventh amendment was passed8 in order to
reaffirm the existence of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its appli-
cability to the states,9 and to protect state treasuries from suits based upon
unpaid Revolutionary War debts.10
By its terms, the eleventh amendment failed to protect the states from
being sued in federal court by their own citizens." The United States
Supreme Court had occasion to consider this omission in Hans v. Louisi-
ana,12 which held that this additional protection from suits in federal
4. Id. at 420. Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina, had brought the action as
executor of the estate of Farquhar, also a citizen of South Carolina, on a claim for
goods delivered to the state of Georgia for which no payment had been received.
J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 726 (1971).
5. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
6. Id. In fact, after the Constitution was written, but prior to its adoption,
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty,
is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore,
there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the States ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton), at 125-26 (bk. 2 E. Bourne ed. 1937) (em-
phasis in original).
7. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419. Three of the Justices - Blair, Cushing, and Jay -
based their decisions upon the belief that the states had surrendered their sovereign
immunity to the Union when they adopted the language of article III. Id. at 450, 466,
469. For pertinent text of article III, see text accompanying note 2 supra. Justice
Wilson believed that the states were never possessed of sovereign immunity. Id. at 453.
Justice Iredell based his dissent upon the language of the First Judiciary Act, which,
he said, limited the Supreme Court's power to issue writs to those necessary for the
exercise of its jurisdiction and "agreeable to the principles and usages of law." Id. at
433-34 (Iredell, J., dissenting), quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73
(repealed) (emphasis omitted). These principles of law, he concluded, encompassed the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Therefore, in his view, the Court's power to issue
writs was limited by that doctrine. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437. Justice Iredell suggested
that article III of the Constitution had not displaced the doctrine. Id.
8. J. GOEBEL, supra note 4, at 734-36. The eleventh amendment became part of
the Constitution in 1798. Id. at 740.
9. Id. at 734-36.
10. See id. at 734, where the author noted: "the prospect of being called to
account for the liquidation of claims, just or not, was a powerful stimulant to political
theory." Id.
11. For the text of the eleventh amendment, see text accompanying note 1 supra.
12. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Prior to the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1875, the
federal courts possessed no generalized jurisdiction over suits "arising under the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States," Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat.
470. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECUSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 844-50 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER]. The major source of their workload was jurisdiction based
upon diversity of citizenship. Id. This might account for the span of 92 years between
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courts by the states' own citizens would also be afforded.1 3 An examination
of the Hans decision sheds some light upon the nature of the eleventh
amendment. The Court did not explicitly extend the amendment's coverage
to include suits against a state by its own citizens ;14 rather, it saw the
amendment merely as an affirmation of the existence of state sovereign
immunity.' 5 The Court agreed with the dissent's view in Chisholm that
the grant of judicial power in article 11116 was merely a grant of jurisdiction
which was not intended to contravene substantive doctrines of state sov-
ereign immunity.'7 In effect, the Hans decision served to overrule Chisholm
rather than extend the coverage of the eleventh amendment.' 8 Notwith-
standing this distinction, courts have subsequently accorded sovereign
immunity defenses in suits by citizens of the defendant states the same
treatment as eleventh amendment defenses.' 9
Even now - more than 175 years after its passage - the precise
nature of the eleventh amendment is not clear.20 Some courts have failed
to distinguish the amendment from the substantive doctrine it embodies,2'
while others have addressed the distinction and noted the procedural prob-
lems it evokes.2 2 The disparity between the form of the amendment, by its
terms a limit on federal judicial power,23 and its historical purpose as an
the passage of the eleventh amendment and the Supreme Court's first occasion to
consider its applicability to a suit between a citizen and his or her own state.
13. 134 U.S. 1.
14. See Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHri.
L. REv. 331, 331-36 (1966).
15. See 134 U.S. at 12-14.
16. For the text of article III, see text accompanying note 2 supra.
17. 134 U.S. at 18-19, citing 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
In support of its conclusion, the Court quoted from James Madison's defense of the
grant of jurisdiction at the Virginia convention: "'It appears to me that this [clause]
can have no operation but this - to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal
courts; and if a State should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance
of it.'" 134 U.S. at 14, quoting 3 ELLIOTT's DEBATES 533 (2d ed. 1859).
18. See Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REV. 1,
22 & n.111 (1967) ; Comment, supra note 14, at 334-35; cf. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944) (by implication).
19. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Parden v. Terminal
Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964).
20. See Cullison, supra note 18.
21. See cases cited in Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment -
Lower Court Interpretations and the Supreme Court Reaction, 61 Gzo. L.J. 1473,
1480 (1973). But see Adams v. Harris County, 316 F. Supp. 938, 943 (S.D. Tex.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
968 (1972). For a general discussion of the substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity,
see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers, 77 HARv. L. REv. pt. 1, at 1;
pt. 2, at 209 (1963).
22. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d
177 (1st Cir. 1974), in which the lower court heard 67 pages of debate as to whether
a motion based upon the eleventh amendment should be considered a motion to dismiss
or a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 179.
23. In In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), the Supreme Court stated: "By the
terms of [the eleventh amendment], it is a case to which the judicial power of the
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affirmation of a substantive legal doctrine, has led to difficulties in keeping
its operation within a cohesive analytical framework.
24
III, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In resolving the question of whether a state agency is the alter ego
or a citizen of the state, two problem areas are encountered. First, it should
be emphasized that a question of federal law is presented, since the court
is interpreting the scope of an amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion .2  Because resolution of the question is generally based upon the
nature of the state agency involved,26 which involves an inquiry into the
state law pertaining to that agency, 21 some courts have erroneously con-
cluded that state law is determinative and binding.28 State court decisional
law is binding as to the relationship of the agency to the state, and there-
fore highly instructive to a federal court in making its decision,29 but the
court's ultimate determination of whether that relationship is sufficiently
close so as to impart the state's eleventh amendment immunity to the
agency is one of federal law. 0
tain it." Id. at 507. In another case, the Court treated the eleventh amendment as a
potential bar to a federal court's jurisdiction in denying plaintiff municipal corpora-
tion's motion to remand the case to state court after it was removed to federal court.
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S.. 56, 70-71 (1921). Since the
municipal corporation was the party seeking relief, the substantive doctrine of sover-
eign immunity was not at issue; the Court merely was deciding the right of the
defendant to bring the municipal corporation before the federal court. See 255 U.S.
at 70-71.
It should be noted, however, that while the eleventh amendment is jurisdic-
tional in nature, its precise operation differs from the usual bars to a federal court's
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Unlike the lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the eleventh amendment defense may be waived. Compare FED. R. Civ. P.
12(h) (3) with Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Unlike lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, the eleventh amendment defense may be raised for the first time on
appeal. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (1) with Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
24. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text infra. See generally Cullison, supra
note 18.
25. See Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n v. Welsh, 188 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir. 1951);
cf. Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 1975) (by im-
plication) ; S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 571
& n.4 (D.N.J. 1967) (by implication).
26. See Krisel v. Duran, 258 F. Supp. 845, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d
179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042 (1968). See generally notes 53-62
and accompanying text infra.
27. For a survey of how the states have applied the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity to their agencies in their own courts, see Note, The Applicability of Sovereign
Immunity to Independent Public Authorities, 74 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1961).
28. See Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 1971)
Moss v. Calumet Paving Co., 201 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
29. See Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461, 474 (1915) ; DeLong
Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. Ore. 1964), aff'd,
343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965).
30. See cases cited in notes 25, 26 & 29 supra.
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The second problem area arises from the failure of some courts to
distinguish the similar but distinct question of when a state agency is a
citizen of the state for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.3l Since a
state itself is not a citizen within the meaning of the diversity jurisdiction
statute, 2 if the agency is held to be the alter ego of the state, an action
between it and a citizen of another state also will not fall within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court.3 3 Since different consequences
result from holding a state agency to be the alter ego of the state for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction as opposed to the eleventh amendment,
34
different considerations should control the issue's resolution. 35 Therefore,
it is submitted that the two inquiries need not necessarily result in the
same conclusion. Unfortunately, there has been little consistency in the
courts' approaches to this issue.
36
31. Diversity jurisdiction is granted to the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970). For a survey of cases addressing the question of when a state agency is a
citizen of the state for diversity jurisdiction purposes, see Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed.
615 (1971).
32. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894).
33. State Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1929).
34. If there is some other basis for the federal court's jurisdiction (e.g., federal
question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)), the agency's citizenship for diversity
purposes is irrelevant. If, on the other hand, there is no other basis for the court's
jurisdiction, a determination that the defendant is the alter ego (and, therefore, not a
citizen) of the state results in the automatic dismissal of the suit. The defendant may
not waive this defect in the court's jurisdiction. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake
Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1884). However, if a defendant is deemed
to be the alter ego of the state for the purposes of the eleventh amendment, the suit
may still continue in federal court if the defendant consents to such suit. See Parden
v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
35. Because lack of diversity results in automatic dismissal from federal court,
with no opportunity for the state to waive this jurisdictional defect, it is submitted
that a narrower standard should be used for diversity purposes in determining when
an agency is entitled to an alter ego status. Moreover, federal diversity jurisdiction
was granted to prevent the supposed prejudice an out-of-state citizen might perceive
in state court. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 1051-53. Dismissing an
out-of-state plaintiff's suit for lack of diversity, when in reality the defendant is quite
closely connected to the state, forces the plaintiff to bring his claim in the atmosphere
from which diversity jurisdiction was designed to save him.
36. Some courts have ignored or overlooked this distinction. See Florida State
Tpk. Auth. v. Van Kirk, 146 F. Supp. 364, 365 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
Some courts have noted the distinction, but have proceeded to treat the ques-
tions as identical. See O'Neill v. Early, 208 F.2d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1953); Charles
Simkin & Sons, Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 352 F. Supp. 177, 179 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd mem., 486 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973); Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Educ.
Cent. School Dist. No. 2, 290 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Some courts have noted the distinction, but have simply asserted that their
resolutions would be the same. See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Tpk.
Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D.N.J. 1967); Krisel v. Duran, 258 F. Supp. 845, 848
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042 (1968).
Finally, some courts have succeeded in discussing the questions separately.
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Once it is determined that the court otherwise has jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the court must decide, as a matter of federal law,
whether the state agency involved is the alter ego of the state for the
purposes of the eleventh amendment. If the court so holds, the amend-
ment protects the agency from being sued in federal court to the same
extent as the state itself.8 7 However, this protection is not absolute.
If the state's substantive law of sovereign immunity shields that agency
from liability as well,38 there is no need for further inquiry. If, however,
the state has statutorily or judicially waived its sovereign immunity, the
court must determine whether that waiver extends to suit in federal court.39
The extent of the waiver depends upon the intent of the legislature or
court responsible for it, and is, therefore, a question of state law. 40 Several
courts have said that such a waiver of a constitutional right will not be
inferred lightly.41 However, states have been held to have waived their
eleventh amendment rights by their entrance into the realm of federally
regulated activity.42 Whether such activity by the state constitutes a
37. The term "alter ego" has often been employed by the courts to mean that the
agency embodies the attributes of the state and is entitled to its protection under the
eleventh amendment. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr.
Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 180 (1st Cir. 1974), quoting Charles Simkin & Sons, Inc. v.
State Univ. Constr. Fund, 352 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
38. The complexities inherent in the interrelationship of the eleventh amendment's
jurisdictional bar to suits against a state, and a state's own common law doctrine of
immunity from liability, are noted in Miller, Service of Process on State, Local, and
Foreign Governments Under Rule 4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Some
Unfinished Business of the Rulemakers, 46 F.R.D. 101, 105-13 (1969). See also
Note, supra note 21, at 1480-82.
39. In Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900), the Supreme Court held that a
state may permit suits against itself in its own courts, but deny that privilege to
a plaintiff seeking to bring a similar action in a federal court. Id. at 441.
40. See Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944); Williams v.
Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 427-28 (10th Cir. 1971).
41. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 468 (1945);
Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
42. In Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Supreme Court held
that, by beginning operation of an interstate railroad 20 years after Congress had
created a cause of action against such railroads, the state of Alabama necessarily
consented to the kind of suit that Congress authorized. Id. at 192. In Chesapeake Bay
Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968), the court, relying
upon Parden, held that by building a bridge over navigable waters, the state of Vir-
ginia entered the federal domain of interstate commerce, thereby consenting to suits
in admiralty. Id. at 1003-04. See also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n,
359 U.S. 275 (1959).
More recently, the Supreme Court held that Congress may, pursuant to its
enforcement power granted in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, enact legis-
lation which provides for private suits against a state which would, in other contexts,
be impermissible under the eleventh amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666
(1976). This is consistent with the view that the fourteenth amendment has effected
a pro tanto waiver or limitation of the eleventh amendment to the extent Congress
effectuates the purposes of the fourteenth amendment by enacting appropriate legisla-
tion. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 694 n.2 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
noting this suggestion as made in an amicus brief in that case. Moreover, Fitzpatrick
may signal the Court's ultimate acceptance of the position that Congress (but not
[VOL. 22
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waiver of its immunity has been held to be a question of federal law. 43 In
sum, the practical effect upon the federal courts of holding an agency to
be the alter ego of the state, and therefore protected by the eleventh amend-
ment, is to permit the state to allow a suit against the agency in state court
and at the same time prohibit that suit from arising in a federal court
even though it may otherwise be within the federal court's jurisdiction."
4
If, upon review of the applicable state law, the federal court holds
the state agency not to be the alter ego of the state for eleventh amend-
ment purposes, the court must address a different set of issues. In that
case, by definition, the agency is not clothed with the state's eleventh
amendment immunity from suit in federal court.45 If the state also has
waived the agency's state sovereign immunity in its own courts, it cannot
deny that consent to suit in the federal courts. 46 If, however, state law
clothes the agency with sovereign immunity in its own courts, the results
become difficult to reconcile with the issue being resolved. Where the
federal court's jurisdiction is based solely upon the parties' diversity of
citizenship, the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins47 compels the court
to grant the agency the same immunity from liability available to it under
state law.48 Where, however, its jurisdiction is based upon the existence
the judiciary) may abrogate the state's sovereign immunity and their eleventh amend-
ment immunity whenever it so chooses while exercising any article I power. See 96
S. Ct. at 2672 (Brennan, J., concurring); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies
About Federalism, 89 HAxv. L. REv. 682, 693-99 (1976).
43. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 194-96 (1964).
44. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra,
45. See note 37 supra.
46. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1908), in which the Supreme
Court held that where a federal court's jurisdiction is not barred by the eleventh
amendment, and where the suit is otherwise within the scope of its jurisdiction as
granted by the Constitution, a state may not defeat that jurisdiction by limiting suits
against a county to the state courts within that county. Id. at 531, citing Cowles v.
Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 122 (1868).
In Markham v. Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961), the Fourth
Circuit addressed the specific contention of the defendant city that the doctrine of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (see note 47 infra), compelled the federal
court to give effect to a state statute which limited the right to sue a political sub-
division of the state to courts of the state. 292 F.2d at 714-16. The court rejected
the applicability of Erie, even though jurisdiction was predicated upon diversity of
citizenship, relying instead upon a line of cases which denied states the right to
preclude suitors from utilizing a federal court whose jurisdiction was otherwise proper.
292 F.2d 711. The court noted, however, that if the eleventh amendment had been
applicable, a different result would have been reached. Id. at 716; see notes 39 & 40
and accompanying text supra.
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court held that in federal court
suits based upon diversity of citizenship, the substantive law of the forum state must
be applied. Id.
48. See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568
(D.N.J. 1967), in which the court stated: "A State institution, not protected by
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of a federally created cause of action,49 the supremacy of federal law over
state law and the absence of the constitutional limitation of the eleventh
amendment combine to give the federal court power to override or acquiesce
in the state's policy.5 0
Thus, the practical effect upon the federal courts of holding an agency
not to be the alter ego of the state, and therefore not protected by the
eleventh amendment, is to give the federal court the power in some cases
to override the state's policy of sovereign immunity even if the state has
not actually or impliedly waived that immunity with respect to the agency
involved. 51
IV. RESOLUTION
In deciding whether a state agency is the alter ego of the state, courts
have often framed the question in terms of whether the state is the real
party in interest.5 2 This, in turn, has been resolved by examining a num-
from diversity suit because the doors of the State courts are closed to its adversary,
and this Court, under Erie, must do likewise." Id. at 571.
The problem presented when federal courts attempt to apply state law was
illustrated by Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817
(1961), in which the Third Circuit was called upon to decide whether the Pennsyl-
vania Turnpike Commission was subject to liability under Pennsylvania state law.
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not spoken on this precise issue, the Third
Circuit based its decision upon analogous state court cases, and held the Commission
liable. Id. This interpretation proved erroneous when the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court subsequently held that the Commission was immune under state law. Rader v.
Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199 (1962). The Third Circuit
thereafter felt compelled by the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
to dismiss a suit based upon Rader, while upholding the inapplicability of the eleventh
amendment that was implicit in Gerr. Harris v. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n, 410 F.2d
1332 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970). But the intrusion upon the
state treasury in Gerr had already been accomplished.
A similar problem was avoided in Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d
247 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970), wherein the court refused to
.dismiss the suit on the ground that the Board of Managers was immune from suit
under the eleventh amendment. Id. at 252. However, in seeking to determine whether
the Board had been provided with immunity from liability under applicable state law,
the court found the law to be uncertain; therefore, it dismissed the case on grounds
of abstention to enable the state courts to make a definitive interpretation. Id. at 253.
For an overview of the court-developed doctrine of abstention, see HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 12, at 985-1009.
49. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
50. No case has been found in which the court has articulated this reasoning as
such. However, in the area of federally created rights, the federal courts are free to
prescribe federal common law. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at
756-70. This includes the power to accept or reject state common law defenses. See
Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718, 721 n.6 (D. Del. 1974).
This situation is distinguishable from that in which the eleventh amendment
otherwise applies to a state or its agency which is held to have waived its application.
See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
51. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
52. This phrase had its origin in a line of cases dealing with the substantially
similar issue of whether, in a given case, the real party in interest is the individually
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ber of factors in the agency's relationship with the state,
5 3 the most signifi-
cant being the effect that a judgment against the agency would have upon
the state treasury. 54 Other factors which have purportedly been considered
by the courts include: the power and ability of the state agency to pay a
judgment;55 the structural framework of the agency;56 legal title to the
agency's property in its name or the state's ;57 the governmental or pro-
named state official or the state itself. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
If the state is found to be the real party in interest, the eleventh amendment prohibits
the suit from being maintained in federal court. Id. This same inquiry is relevant to
whether a particular form of relief is available in federal court. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
53. For a general survey of what factors have accounted for the courts' decisions,
see Comment, State Governmental Corporation Immunity from Federal Jurisdiction
under the Eleventh Amendment, 72 DIcK. L. REv. 296 (1968) ; Note, supra note 27.
54. The following cases have held the agency to be the alter ego of the state:
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Harris v. Tooele
County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees
of the State Colleges, 356 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1966) ; O'Neill v. Early, 208 F.2d 286
(4th Cir. 1953).
The following cases have held the agency not to be alter ego of the state:
Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Missouri R.R. & Warehouse Comm'rs, 183 U.S. 53
(1901); Adams v. Rankin County Bd. of Educ., 524 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Bowen
v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.I. 1975); Raymond Int'l, Inc. v. M/T Dal-
zelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey
Tpk. Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568 (D.N.J. 1967); Moss v. Calumet Paving Co., 201 F.
Supp. 426 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
For the view that the effect of a judgment upon the state's treasury is of
overriding importance in determining whether the state is the real party in interest,
see Note, supra note 21, at 1483-87.
55. The following cases have held the agency to be alter ego of the state: State
Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194 (1929); Krisel v. Duran, 258
F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), af'd, 386 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1042 (1968).
The following cases have held the agency not to be alter ego of the state:
Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718 (D. Del. 1974); Fabrizio &
Martin, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); N.M. Paterson
& Sons, Ltd. v. Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
56. The following cases have held the agency to be alter ego of the state:
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st Cir.
1974); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ore.
1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965) ; Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. State Rds. Comm'n, 187 F. Supp. 766 (D. Md. 1960).
The following cases have held the agency not to be alter ego of the state:
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273
(5th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Marshall County, 394 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1968); Adams
v. Harris County, 316 F. Supp. 938 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972); George A. Fuller Co.
v. Coastal Plains, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1968).
57. The following cases have held the agency to be alter ego of the state:
Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461 (1915); Murray v. Wilson Dis-
tilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909) ; Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287 (10th
Cir. 1971); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. La. 1968).
The following case has held the agency not to be alter ego of the state:
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prietary nature of the agency's function ;58 the decisions of the state courts
in related matters ;59 the power of the agency to sue and be sued ;60 the
power of the agency to contract ;61 and, the extent to which the state has
pledged its credit to pay the agency's debts.6 2 By evaluating these factors,
the courts have decided whether the federal courts could exercise jurisdic-
tion over: cities and counties ;63 school districts and school boards ;64 other
geographical entities ;65 state-operated colleges and universities ;61 highway
58. The following cases have held the agency to be alter ego of the state: Wihtol
v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962) (school district performing governmental func-
tion) ; Oklahoma Real Estate Comm'n v. National Bus. & Prop. Exch., Inc., 229 F.2d
205 (10th Cir. 1955) (real estate commission performing governmental function);
Florida State Tpk. Auth. v. Van Kirk, 146 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1956) (turnpike
authority performing governmental function).
The following case has held the agency not to be alter ego of the state:
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (state does not have
proprietary interest in railroad commission).
59. The following cases have held the agency not to be alter ego of the state:
Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Tpk. Comm'n, 272 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Louisiana
Highway Comm'n v. Farnsworth, 74 F.2d 910 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 294 U.S.
729 (1935).
60. In Hopkins v. Clemson Agri. College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), the Court held
the agency not to be the alter ego of the state.
61. In Baton Rouge Contracting Co. v. West Hatchie Drainage Dist., 279 F.
Supp. 430 (N.D. Miss. 1968), the court held the agency not to be the alter ego of
the state.
62. In Charles Simkin & Sons, Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 352 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mer., 486 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), the court held the agency to be
the alter ego of the state.
63. The following cases have held the city or county not to be alter ego of the
state: Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Brown v. Marshall County,
394 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1968); Markham v. Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir.
1961); Adams v. Harris County, 316 F. Supp. 938 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972) ; N.M. Pater-
son & Sons, Ltd. v. Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
64. The following cases have held the school district or school board to be alter
ego of the state: Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973) ;
Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); O'Neill v. Early, 208 F.2d 286 (4th
Cir. 1953).
The following cases have held the school district or school board not to be
alter ego of the state: Adams v. Rankin County Bd. of Educ., 524 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.
1975) ; Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975);
Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
65. The following case has held the district to be alter ego of the state: Fylipoy
v. Gulf Stevedore Corp., 257 F. Supp. 166 (S.D. Tex. 1966) (navigation district).
The following cases have held the district not to be alter ego of the state:
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) ; Baton Rouge Con-
tracting Co. v. West Hatchie Drainage Dist., 279 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
66. The following cases have held the college to be alter ego of the state: Long
v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1975) ; Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d
1287 (10th Cir. 1971) ; Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges, 356 F.2d 599
(10th Cir. 1966).
The following cases have held the college not to be alter ego of the state:
Hopkins v. Clemson Agri. College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911); Hander v. San Jacinto
Junior College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975) ; Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381
F. Supp. 718 (D. Del. 1974).
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commissions ;67 bridge and port authorities ;68 ratemaking bodies ;69 develop-
ment commissions;7° regulatory commissions;71 treasury departments;72
and employment security departments 
a
It is evident from the cited cases that in deciding a state agency's
amenability to suit in federal court, the courts have reached varying results
while purporting to apply the same test - whether the agency is the alter
ego of the state. It is submitted that this question should properly be re-
solved within the context of the purposes of the eleventh amendment.
Viewing the amendment in its historical setting, those purposes are shown
to have been twofold. One was to reaffirm the existence of sovereign
immunity3 4 This was accomplished by passage of the amendment and
by the Supreme Court's subsequent acquiescence, in Hans v. Louisiana,75
67. The following cases have held the highway commission to be alter ego of
the state: State Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194 (1929) ; DeLong
Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ore. 1964), aff'd, 343
F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. State
Rds. Comm'n, 187 F. Supp. 766 (D. Md. 1960); Florida State Tpk. Auth. v. Van
Kirk, 146 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
The following cases have held the highway commission not to be alter ego
of the state: Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Tpk. Comm'n, 272 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.
1959); Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Farnsworth, 74 F.2d 910 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 729 (1935); Southern Bridge Co. v. Department of Highways, 319
F. Supp. 948 (E.D. La. 1970); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth.,
268 F. Supp. 568 (D.N.J. 1967); Moss v. Calumet Paving Co., 201 F. Supp. 426
(S.D. Ind. 1962).
68. The following case has held the port authority to be alter ego of the state:
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. La. 1968).
The following cases have held the authority not to be alter ego of the state:
Raymond Int'l, Inc. v. M/T Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); George
A. Fuller Co. v. Coastal Plains, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1968).
69. The following cases have held the ratemaking body not to be alter ego of the
state: Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Missouri R.R. & Warehouse Comm'rs, 183 U.S.
53 (1901); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
70. The following cases have held the commission to be alter ego of the state:
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st Cir.
1974) ; Charles Simkin & Sons, Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 352 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mern., 486 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973); Krisel v. Duran, 258 F. Supp.
845 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1042
(1968).
The following case has held the commission not to be alter ego of the state:
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
892 (1972).
71. The following cases have held the regulatory commission to be alter ego of the
state: Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461 (1915); Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909) ; Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651 (5th
Cir. 1972), aff'g 332 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1971); Louisiana Land & Exploration
Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 229 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956);
Oklahoma Real Estate Comm'n v. National Bus. & Prop. Exch., Inc., 229 F.2d 205
(10th Cir. 1955).
72. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), the
Court held the department to be the alter ego of the state.
73. In Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.I. 1975), the court held the
department not to be the alter ego of the state.
74. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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to its inherent political message.7 6 The amendment's second purpose was
to protect state treasuries which were at the time threatened by unpaid
Revolutionary War debts.7 7 It is this second purpose upon which the
courts should focus in deciding whether to accord the state agency the
same protection as it would the parent state. Thus, it is submitted, the
result should turn solely upon whether the state's general treasury will
be diminished by a resulting judgment, or whether, conversely, the agency
is separately funded from sources other than the state's general revenues.
The reason for the contradictory holdings in the cited cases may per-
haps be due to the disparity between the issue presented and the conse-
quences that flow from its resolution. First, if the question arises in a
case within a federal court's diversity jurisdiction, the only difference
between granting and withholding eleventh amendment protection is that
the plaintiff may have to bring his action in a state court to obtain relief.
7 8
With little riding upon the outcome of its determination in this situation,
a federal court might be loathe to override state policy. Second, if the
question arises in a case based upon a federally created cause of action,
the difference in result will be more severe. If eleventh amendment protec-
tion is afforded the agency, the plaintiff may be left without a cause of
action which the court would otherwise have the power to hear if the agency
was not thereby protected. 70 There is a potential in federal question cases,
therefore, for more onerous results if state policy is held to be controlling.
Thus a court's decision may be influenced by considerations that logically
lay outside the proper scope of the issue. Moreover, once it is determined
whether an agency is subject to the amendment's protection, stare decisis
may conclude the issue as to that agency for all subsequent cases.
The problem of how to reconcile the eleventh amendment with feder-
ally created causes of action is broader than the question of how to treat
a state agency - it is inherent in the amendment itself as applied to the
parent states as well as their agencies. The Supreme Court has recently
taken another step in solving that problem by holding that the eleventh
amendment is inapplicable when federal jurisdiction is created by Con-
gress pursuant to its power under the fourteenth amendment.80 Perhaps
that is just one step in a larger trend toward abrogation of the eleventh
amendment for all federally created causes of action.8 ' But regardless of
the evolution of the eleventh amendment vis-A-vis the states in general,
its application to agencies of the states should be decided on a more rational
and uniform basis.
Martin Silfen
76. Id. at 12.
77. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
79. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
80. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976).
81. See id. at 2672 (Brennan, J., concurring); Tribe, supra note 42, at 693-99;
Cullison, supra note 18, at 14-35.
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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - INCLUSION OF CONTINGENT CON-
SIDERATION IN AN INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRACT PREVENTS A TAX-
PAYER FROM REPORTING GAIN UNDER THE INSTALLMENT PROVISIONS
OF SECTION 453.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a taxpayer sells an asset, realizing gain' which is recognized
under section 1002 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code),2 and receives in
exchange a small amount of cash, debt obligations which by their terms are
to be paid in installments over a period of years, and additional considera-
tion which is either indefinite with respect to the dollar amount, contingent
upon future events, or both,3 a problem arises as to whether he may avail
himself of the installment method of reporting income as provided in section
453 of the Code.4 Two recent court of appeals decisions, Steen v. United
States5 and Gralapp v. United States,6 while ostensibly giving the taxpayers
relief by classifying this type of sales contract as an open transaction,7 have
used that determination to deny them the benefits of section 453.
The initial findings by both courts - that because of the contingent
consideration s the amount realized under the entire contract was indefinite,
1. "Gain" is defined as "the excess of the amount realized . . . over the adjusted
basis." I.R.C. § 1001(a). For the definitions of "adjusted basis," see note 9 infra.
"Amount realized" is defined as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market
value of the property (other than money) received." I.R.C. § 1001 (b).
2. Section 1002 states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, on the
sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under
section 1001, shall be recognized." Id. § 1002.
3. The transaction should be distinguished from that involved in Commissioner
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). In that case the total consideration was fixed, but
the amount of each installment was dependent upon the current profits of the buyer.
Id. at 567.
4. Section 453(b) (1) provides: "Income from - (A) a sale or other disposi-
tion of real property, or (B) a casual sale . . . of personal property . . . for a price
exceeding $1,000, may . . . be returned on the basis and in a manner prescribed in
subsection (a)." I.R.C. § 453(b) (1).
Section 453(a) (1) provides in pertinent part:
A person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on the
installment plan may return as income therefrom in any taxable year that pro-
portion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross
profit, realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total
contract price.
Id. § 453(a) (1).
5. 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975).
6. 458 F.2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'g 319 F. Supp. 265 (D. Kans. 1970).
7. Open transactions for tax purposes are those in which the consideration at
the time of the agreement "had no ascertainable fair market value." Burnet v. Logan,
283 U.S. 404, 413 (1931). For a discussion of the significance of an open transaction,
see note 11 and text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
8. A seller may wish to include a contingency in the contract to give himself a
hedge against inflation, whereas a buyer may desire such a contingency to protect
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and the taxpayer was therefore entitled to defer the gain and the resultant
taxes thereon, until he had recovered his adjusted basis9 - were in accord-
ance with the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Burnet v. Logan.10
Although this appeared to be a victory for the taxpayer,' both courts
quickly made it a hollow one by holding that a fixed sales price, which is
not present in this type of contract, is a prerequisite for use of the tax relief
provided by section 453.12 The ultimate outcome is that a taxpayer may
be required to remit cash to the Treasury in the year of sale which exceeds
the amount received from the purchaser during that period.'8
The results of Steen and Gralapp appear to conflict with the ruling of
the Colorado federal district court in National Farmers Union Service
Corp. v. United States.14 In that case, the court permitted the taxpayer to
treat the amount of the contingent consideration as a separate open transac-
tion, but it did not foreclose the use of section 453 for reporting the gain
attributable to the noncontingent consideration.' 5 Interestingly, the Gralapp
court did not expressly overrule, nor did the Steen court distinguish, the
decision in National Farmers Union.
After presenting a brief history of section 453 and the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Burnet v. Logan, this Comment analyzes the Steen decision' 6
9. The adjusted basis of most taxpayers' property is cost as modified by certain
adjustments provided in section 1016 of the Code. See I.R.C. §§ 1012, 1016.
10. 283 U.S. 404 (1931). For a discussion of Logan, see text accompanying
notes 26-32 infra.
11. If a transaction is held to be an open one, the contingent payment is deemed
to be part of the total sales price, and is not considered ordinary income, but rather,
capital gain. See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. at 413. Therefore, the taxpayer is
afforded advantages of the section 1202 deduction of 50% of the net long-term capital
gain. See I.R.C. § 1202.
12. Steen v. United States, 509 F.2d at 1403-04; Gralapp v. United States, 458
F.2d at 1160. Section 453(a) (1) indicates that it is necessary to determine the total
contract price in order to ascertain the percentage of each installment which represents
taxable gain. For the text of section 453(a) (1), see note 4 supra.
13. For example, if a high bracket taxpayer who is not using section 453 received
$10,000 in cash and obligations with a fair market value of $90,000 in exchange for
property in which his adjusted basis was $50,000, he would have a tax liability of
$12,500 in the year of the sale by using the alternative tax provisions of section 1201 (b)
(tax equals 25% of first $50,000 of gain). This would be 25% more than his cash
receipt.
14. [1967] 1 U.S. TAX CAs. 83,480 (D. Colo., Jan. 17, 1967), aff'd on other
grounds, 400 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1968); see note 97 and accompanying text infra.
15. [1967] 1 U.S. TAX CAs. at 83,484. In National Farmers Union, the sale
price of an interest in a phosphate lease was $100,000, payable in four annual install-
ments of $25,000 each. Id. Also, the seller was entitled to an additional $52,500 if
and when a refund of a deposit was received by the buyer. Id. The Commissioner
asserted that the total section 453 contract price should have been $152,500; thus, a
larger portion of each installment should have been treated as gain. Id. The court
rejected the Commissioner's argument, agreeing that the taxpayer's reporting of the
$52,500 as ordinary income in the year of receipt was proper. Id.
Since the method asserted by the Commissioner was obviously more advan-
tageous to the taxpayer, it must be assumed that the permissible time period for filing
amended returns had elapsed.
16. Since the Steen decision followed Gralapp, this Comment will focus primarily
upon Steen. However, Gralapp will be discussed for purposes of comparison, since
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and suggests various approaches - including one based upon the rationale
of the court in National Farmers Union - which Congress could take to
remedy the problem. This Comment also suggests interim solutions to
assist the taxpayer in avoiding the potentially adverse consequences in-




A general rule of federal income taxation is that all gains or losses
realized are recognized in the year of sale or exchange.' 7 This rule operates
satisfactorily when the consideration for the sale is paid entirely in cash
or its equivalent. However, transactions in which cash and promises of
future payment are exchanged for the taxpayer's property pose a different
problem in that, absent some particular relief, a taxpayer could be required
to pay more federal income taxes in the year of exchange than he had
actually received as a cash deposit.' 8
As early as 1918, the Coni'missioner of Internal Revenue (Commission-
er) recognized the difficulty caused by deferred payments, and promulgated
regulations permitting the seller to report the income on the installment
basis.19 In the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress approved the regulations,
but failed to indicate any limits on the use of installment reporting.2 0 The
principal difficulty with the regulations, as approved by Congress, was that
the postponement of the recognition of gain would cause the Treasury to
lose revenue during the years immediately following a taxpayer's adoption
the Steen court could have pointed to the factual distinction between the cases as a
basis for reaching a different result. See notes 70-76 and accompanying text infra.
17. 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 15.01 (J. Malone
rev. ed. 1967).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. Article 117 of Treasury Regulation 33 provided in pertinent part:
In the case of a contract to sell real estate or other property on the installment plan,
title remaining in the vendor until the property is fully paid for, the income to
be returned by the vendor will be that proportion of each installment payment
which the gross profit to be realized when the property is paid for bears to the
gross contract price.
Treas. Reg. 33, art. 117 (1918) (Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(a), T.D. 6314, 1958-2 C.B.).
It is interesting to note, however, that article 116 of the same regulation did
not give similar treatment to transactions in which the title passed to the purchaser
at the execution of the contract. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 116 (1918).
20. Section 202(f) of the Revenue Act of 1921 provided: "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to prevent (in the case of property sold under contract provid-
ing for payment in installments) the taxation of that portion of any installment
payment representing gain or profit in the year in which such payment is received."
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(f), 42 Stat. 231. Similar language was also used
in the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(e), 43
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of the installment method. 21 In the Revenue Act of 1926, Congress re-
solved the problem by reapproving installment reporting while at the same
time making a change to that method costly to the taxpayer.
22
Since 1926, Congress has made several minor changes to the install-
ment accounting provisions,2 3 but it has continued to support the concept
of allowing a taxpayer who has not received a substantial portion of his
sales price in cash or its equivalent to defer the taxes attributable to the
payments to be received in subsequent years.24 Indeed, an early articula-
tion of the intent of Congress in allowing installment reporting would,
even today, accurately summarize the policies underlying section 453:
The method of reporting income on the installment basis was
enacted by Congress as a relief provision. The chief idea which moti-
vated Congress in allowing the installment method of reporting income
was to enable a merchant to actually realize the profit arising out of
each installment before the tax was paid. In other words, the tax
could be paid from the proceeds collected rather than be advanced
by the taxpayer.2 5
B. Open Transactions
Unlike the installment accounting provisions of section 453, the treat-
ment accorded open transactions is not legislatively or administratively
grounded, but is rooted in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Burnet v. Logan . 2  The Logan Court, construing the Revenue Act of
21. In B.B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762 (1925), the Board of Tax Appeals asserted:
To be sure, the period of collection of accounts is probably longer, losses are
perhaps slightly higher; but neither of these factors, in view of the results in
net profits, appears to the Board to warrant special and favorable treatment of
this class of taxpayers at the expense of all other classes of taxpayers reporting
income on the cash or accrual basis.
Id. at 766.
22. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1208, 44 Stat. 19. This section required a
taxpayer who adopted the installment method to report as income in the current year
that portion of the payments received which the gross profit bore to the total price.
Id. This was required even if the entire profit had already been reported in previous
years. Id. The 1926 Act did contain some refund provisions, but their effectiveness
was weakened by the five-year statute of limitations. Id. § 1113(a), 44 Stat. 116.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for adjustments in tax for
amounts previously taxed. See I.R.C. § 453(c).
23. Section 453(b) (2) (A) was adopted in 1954 in order to eliminate the former
requirement (see XII - 2 C.B. 57, 59 (1933)) that there be some downpayment in
the year of the sale; at the same time, the section provided that all payments received
during that year would be aggregated to determine if the permissible 30% down-
payment limitation had been exceeded. I.R.C. § 453(b) (2) (A). Section 44 of the
Revenue Act of 1934 changed the maximum downpayment limitation to the present
30%. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 44(b), 48 Stat. 694. Previously, the down-
payment had been increased to 40%. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 44(b), 45
Stat. 805.
24. See I.R.C. § 453; note 4 supra.
25. Thomas F. Prendergast, 22 B.T.A. 1259, 1262 (1931). See also Consolidated
Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 878, 881 (D. Mass. 1960).
26. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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1916,27 held that income tax liability on the gain from the sale of stock
for a downpayment plus a royalty conditioned upon future mineral extrac-
tion should not be based upon "resort to mere estimates, assumptions, and
speculation. '28 The Court stated that "[w]hen the profit, if any, is actually
realized, the taxpayer will be required to respond. ' '2 9 The Court distin-
guished a closed transaction - one in which the consideration had a present
fair market value - from an open transaction 30 - one in which the
consideration "had no ascertainable fair market value [and thus] was not
a closed one." 3 1 The Court held that the taxpayer recognizing gain from
an open transaction was entitled to "the return of . . . capital investment
before [being subjected to] assessment of any taxable profit based on
conjecture.
'32
Since the Logan decision, the Commissioner has carefully scrutinized
any attempt to apply the open transaction analysis to a particular set of facts.
Treasury Regulation section 1.1001-1(a) states that "only in rare and
extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market
value."'33 Thus, the open transaction is viewed by the Commissioner as
a taxpayer relief measure which should be applied sparingly.
34
In sum, both the congressional enactment of the installment account-
ing provisions of the Code and the Supreme Court's recognition of special
tax treatment for open transactions stem from a cognizance of the in-
equities inherent in requiring a seller to pay taxes today on money he may
or may not receive at some future date. The next section of this Comment
will analyze how one court, while acknowledging the taxpayer's right to
invoke the open transaction doctrine, relied upon that finding to bar use of
section 453.
III. THE Steen DECISION
A. The Rationale of the Steen Decision
In 1962, Steen and several associates entered into a contract for the
sale of the controlling interest in a Utah mining corporation (Utex) to
Atlas Corporation (Atlas) . 5 The total sales price was $12,980,000, of
which $3,890,000 (or 29.9%) was paid at the closing.3 6 The remainder
27. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2, 39 Stat. 757-58.
28. 283 U.S. at 412.
29. Id. at 413.
30. The term "open transaction" was coined by subsequent commentators. See,
e.g., Emory, The Installment Method of Reporting Income: Its Election, Use, and
Effect, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 181, 186 (1968).
31. 283 U.S. at 413.
32. Id.
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957) ; see Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
34. See Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
35. 509 F.2d at 1401. Steen and others had discovered uranium in Utah. Through
a series of transfers, incorporations, and exchanges they reduced their holdings to
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was to be paid in installments.37 Steen's share of the total was $10,666,024
(82.17%), and he received $3,196,413 as his pro rata share of the down-
payment as well as 82.17% of the installment obligations.
8
8
Contemporaneously with the signing of the sales contract, some of the
sellers"9 entered into a management contract with Atlas, agreeing to operate
the mine for a period of years. 40 At the time of the agreement, the status
of a Utah tax levied upon ore removed from the mine was in doubt; it was
unclear whether the tax imposed a personal obligation upon the mine owner
or merely created a lien against the mine property.41 This had significant
economic consequences for the owner. 42 In order to shift the risk of the
tax burden to the seller, the purchase price was computed by assuming
that the tax, which the parties estimated at $827,000 would be Atlas' per-
sonal liability when levied. However, the management contract included
a proviso that the operators would receive, as additional compensation, the
amount by which the $827,000 estimate exceeded the actual tax liability
of Atlas.48 Subsequently, the Utah Supreme Court construed the state
tax provisions as not imposing a personal obligation upon the owner, 44 a
result which caused the tax payments to be less than the estimated amount
by approximately $500,000 of which Steen's share was $458,532. 4 5
Steen elected to report his gain on the transaction under the section
453 installment method,46 thereby recognizing as long-term capital gain
37. Id. The notes were payable over a four-year period from August 1962
through December 1966. Id. In order to dramatize the tax consequences of the
decision, it will be assumed that the notes were due over an eight-year period, and
bore interest at the rate of 8% per annum.
38. Id.
39. First Security Bank of Utah, the trustee of a trust established for the benefit
of Steen's children, was one of the sellers, but did not participate in the management
contract. Id. at 1401 n.1.
40. Id. at 1401. Atlas wanted Utex personnel to continue to mine the property
sold because of their proven mining ability. Id.
41. Id.
42. If the tax enforcement was restricted to execution on the mine property, the
owner could work the mine out and abandon it to the tax collector after a few years.
At this point, the worked-out mine would have only negligible economic value. How-
ever, if the tax was the personal liability of the owner, then all its assets would have
been exposed to the collector's enforcing levy. See San Juan County v. Jen, Inc.,
16 Utah 2d 394, 401 P.2d 952 (1965).
43. 509 F.2d at 1401.
44. Atlas Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 18 Utah 2d 57, 415 P.2d 208 (1966) ; see
San Juan County v. Jen, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 394, 401 P.2d 952 (1965). Both decisions
held that "the ad valorem tax against a mining property is not essentially different,
though based on a net proceeds formula in determining valuation, than the tax on
other real property." 18 Utah 2d at 58, 415 P.2d at 208. These decisions relieved
Atlas of personal liability for the tax, and permitted it to abandon the mine to the
tax collector's levy. See note 42 supra.
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90.62%o of each dollar received in the year of actual receipt.4 7 When the
contingent amount was received, he reported $445,942 as additional long-
term capital gain from the Utex stock sale.48 The Commissioner argued
that the income was not capital gain because it arose from an agreement
for services rather than from the sale of an asset.49 Thus, the initial issue
was whether the taxpayer was entitled to a $222,971 section 1202 deduc-
tion,"° which under present law would have prevented additional tax
liability of approximately $156,080. 51
Holding that the contingent provision reflected a part of the purchase
price for the asset, the court agreed with Steen's assertion that the con-
tracts should be integrated. 52 Since the contract had no ascertainable fair
market value in the year of the sale, it did not give rise to taxable gain
until the adjusted basis of the property was recovered; thereafter, Steen
would recognize capital gain as he received the installment payments.
5 3
However, the court, apparently on its own initiative, concluded that since
part of the purchase price was not ascertainable, the entire contract price was
contingent and the taxpayer was therefore barred from using the section
453 installment method. 54 The court reasoned that precise determination
of the total contract price was an implicit requirement of section 453.55
As a result, Steen was deemed to have received the $3,196,413 down-
payment and the present value of the installment obligations in the year
that the contract was signed ;56 thus, he immediately owed taxes on the
amount by which this aggregate amount exceeded his adjusted basis in
the property.
57
47. Id. The opinion of the court did not disclose Steen's adjusted basis in the
property. In order to simplify the tax calculations, this Comment assumes that his
adjusted basis was $1,000,000.
The 90.62% is determined by dividing the gross profit, $9,666,024, by the
total amount received, $10,666,024, in accordance with the formula in section 453 (a) (1)
of the Code. For the text of section 453(a) (1), see note 4 supra.
48. 509 F.2d at 1401. Steen claimed a basis in the contingency of $12,590, which
he deducted from the $458,532 gross receipt pursuant to section 1001 (a) of the Code.
Id. at 1401. The Commissioner did not contest Steen's asserted basis of $12,590, and
the court accepted it as an undisputed fact; the opinion does not disclose the manner
in which Steen calculated the $12,590 basis.
49. Id.
50. Section 1202 provides that "if for any taxable year the net long-term capital
gain exceeds the net short-term capital loss, 50 percent of the amount of such excess
shall be a deduction from.gross income." I.R.C. § 1202.
51. This Comment assumes that Steen was a single taxpayer with taxable income
of $100,000 from sources other than the sale of the Utex stock. This places all addi-
tional income in an effective 70% tax bracket; conversely, any deduction that Steen
would have been permitted causes a 70% tax saving. Seventy percent of the section
1202 deduction (see text accompanying note 50 supra) equals $156,080.
52. 509 F.2d at 1403; see notes 63-65 and accompanying text infra.
53. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
54. 509 F.2d at 1404.
55. Id. at 1402 n.2.
56. Id. at 1405; see note 87 supra.
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B. Evaluation of the Steen Decision
In holding that the contracts should be integrated, the Steen court
accepted the lower court's finding as conclusive. Both the referee in bank-
ruptcy"' and the district court, without considering the section 453 con-
sequences, had concluded that the two agreements constituted a single
transaction.59 In deferring to this finding, the Steen court cited several
decisions which indicated that the lower court's conclusion could be over-
turned only if it was "clearly erroneous." 0 It is submitted, however, that
the cited cases might have been distinguished on the theory that they all
involved appellate court deference to findings of the pre-1970 Tax Court,6 1
an independent agency in the executive branch of the government, rather
than to those of an article III court, 62 especially one under the direct
supervision of the reviewing court of appeals.
6 3
58. When the action arose, Steen was the debtor in a chapter XII bankruptcy
proceeding. 509 F.2d at 1400.
59. Id. at 1402.
60. 509 F.2d at 1402, citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960)
(particular transaction was either gift or compensation) ; Chism's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963) (withdrawal from a corporation was dividend,
loan, or salary) ; Cohn v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1955) (certain property
held either for investment or for resale). It should be noted that all three foregoing
cases had been appealed to article III courts from the pre-1970 Tax Court.
61. Effective December 30, 1969, the Tax Court became a tribunal established
under article I of the Constitution. I.R.C. § 7441. For an overview of the procedure
used for appealing pre-1970 decisions of the Tax Court to the courts of appeals, see
Ash, Review of Tax Court and Administrative Agency Decisions Under the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 FED. B.J. 126 (1968).
62. Article III of the Constitution grants to Congress the authority to ordain
and establish inferior courts; such courts are vested with part of the judicial power
of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The establishing legislation must
comply with the limitations of that article. Glidden Company v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
552 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring). While article III requires that judges of courts
created pursuant to the authority granted therein have lifetime tenure, U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1, the legislation which created the United States Tax Court specifies a
15-year term for judges of that tribunal. I.R.C. § 7443(e).
63. The distinction which the court might have made can be highlighted by
examining a prior Ninth Circuit decision. In Vernon v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 173
(9th Cir. 1961), the court held that a court of appeals cannot retry facts on a petition
to review a decision of the Tax Court. Id. If this is the "clearly erroneous" test
which the Steen court espoused, then it is submitted that the criteria which are
applied to findings of the district courts could be less rigid. This Comment does not
purport to define the distinction between the scope of review used by a court of appeals
in hearing appeals from decisions of the district courts and that applied to decisions
originating in administrative or executive courts, but only intends to indicate a point
on which the court could have distinguished the cited case law. It is recognized that
section 7482 of the Code grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeals "to review the
decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions
of the district courts." I.R.C. § 7482.
It is significant that the court cited Parker v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 364
(9th Cir. 1948), for the proposition that the contracts should be integrated, but failed
to notice that in the very same case the court of appeals had reversed a finding of
a grantor's intent to retain a right in a trust by the Tax Court. Id. at 368-69.
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Having given determinate weight to the lower court's finding, the
Steen court proceeded to justify that finding without testing its accuracy.
The authority upon which the court relied, although diverse in origin,
merely addressed certain circumstances under which integration would be
required. 64 Although the court listed conditions which supported integra-
tion,6 5 it made no attempt to balance them with four countervailing factors:
1) the parties to the two contracts were not identical ;66 2) the state tax
liability arose during the period of the management contract, and was not
directly related to the sale or sale price ;67 3) the contracts for the sale and
operation of the mine were clearly distinguishable with respect to subject
matter; and 4) the purpose of the management contract was to employ
the former owners' expertise in extracting the ore.68 It is suggested that
in light of the adverse effect that integration had in this case, the court
should have at least analyzed these distinctive elements and reached an
independent conclusion regarding the decision to integrate the agreements.
Without examining any counterarguments to its finding that the entire
sales contract was an open transaction69 because the contingency had no
ascertainable value at the time of the sale, the court, apparently relying
solely on Gralapp,70 held that section 453 was not available to a taxpayer
with a truly open transaction.71 Again, in view of the tax consequences
of such a decision, it is submitted that the court should have evaluated
alternative approaches before strictly construing the Code.
64. Parker v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Kurz v. United
States, 156 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1958). Kurz
held that contracts should be integrated if they "are designed to effectuate the same
purpose." 156 F. Supp. at 103. It is submitted, however, that the two Steen contracts
had distinct purposes - sale and operation. In Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28
Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972), the Supreme Court of Utah integrated an employ-
ment contract with a lease to form a concession contract. Id. at 267, 501 P.2d at 271.
Neither contract would have served any useful purpose without the other. Id. In
Steen, however, the sale of the mine could have been completed without the manage-
ment contract. 509 F.2d at 1401.
65. These included the size of the transaction, the related subject matter of the
two documents, and the contemporaneous negotiation, drafting, execution, and delivery
of the contracts. 509 F.2d at 1403.
66. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
67. Taxes were levied on the annual proceeds derived from operation of the mine.
See San Juan County v. Jen, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 394, 401 P.2d 952 (1965).
68. 509 F.2d at 1401. The court stated that "Atlas ... want[ed] the Utex manage-
ment personnel to continue because of their proven ability to operate [the mine]." Id.
69. Id. at 1403-04.
70. Gralapp and his associates had sold their interests in oil and gas leases for
a cash payment in the year of sale, promissory notes which were due the following
year, and a contingent additional consideration based upon the present value of 48%
of future net revenues to be calculated after 495,852 barrels of oil had been extracted.
458 F.2d at 1160. The taxpayer failed to assert that these were two separate contracts.
Id. at 1160 n.1. After recognizing the stipulated fact that the contingency could not
be valued in the year of sale, the court concluded that "the value of the contingency
under the sales agreement is by no means de minimis as an element of actual sales
price." 458 F.2d at 1160 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the application of this
standard to Steen, see notes 74-77 and accompanying text infra.
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The court interpreted the de minimus language of Gralapp72 as pro-
pounding an absolute test.7 3 However, the Gralapp court, which denied
the taxpayer use of section 453 only after finding that the amount of the
contingency was not de minimus, stated: "We . . . do not accept as an
absolute... the position of the government, that a taxpayer cannot properly
elect in any instance to report on an installment basis the proceeds of a
sale received on a contract having an open end selling price." 74 The Steen
court apparently ignored this qualifying language in the Gralapp opinion
and failed to distinguish it on its facts. The difference between the 4%
contingency in Steen75 and the 40% contingency in Gralapp76 would have
been apparent to the Steen court had it considered the de minimus standard
as a relative, rather than an absolute, test.
7
Alternatively, the court could have applied a rationale similar to that
developed by the Supreme Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Com-
missioner.78 In that case, the Court relied upon what it considered the
general congressional purpose, even though it was not expressed in the
statute or clearly indicated in the legislative history.7 9 Utilizing this type
of analysis, the Steen court could have found that Congress' intent to
provide the taxpayer with a tax relief measure in section 45380 should not
be subordinated to the judicial imposition of inflexible prerequisites to
use of the installment accounting provisions.
Another alternative would have been to apply the Tax Court's reason-
ing in W.B. Rushing.8 l In Rushing, the court agreed with the taxpayer
72. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
73. 509 F.2d at 1403 n.8.
74. 458 F.2d at 1159-60.
75. 509 F.2d at 1401.
76. In Gralapp, the total consideration was $1,189,986, of which $549,986 was the
contingent amount. 458 F.2d at 1161-62.
77. The court focused upon the "potential size of the contingency payment,"
509 F.2d at 1403 n.8, citing for comparison Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th
Cir. 1971). Northern, however, involved a prisoner's claim of denial of due process;
the court refused to award damages for the value of an old newspaper, saying that
the value was de minimis. It is submitted that by using absolute size as the test of
de minimis, the Steen court foreclosed any possibility of considering Steen's share
of the tax refund from Atlas de minimis in relation to the total consideration received
by him under the integrated contract.
78. 350 U.S. 46 (1951). The taxpayer in Corn Products argued that a corn
future transaction was not a hedge; hence, it was entitled to report any profits as a
gain from the sale of a capital asset. Id. at 48.
79. The Court found that the future transaction in this case was similar to a
hedge, and that there was a congressional intention to tax profits from hedge trans-
actions as ordinary income; therefore, this transaction would be so taxed. Id. at 53.
80. See notes 19-25 and accompanying text supra.
81. 52 T.C. 888 (1969). In Rushing, the taxpayer was allowed to exclude from
his section 453 computation of sales price the present value of a note on which the
maker was disputing his liability. Id. at 895.
[VOL. 22'
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that the Supreme Court decision in North American Oil Consolidated v.
Burnet8 2 stood for the proposition that the computations of "gross profit"
and "total contract price" under section 453 did not include the disputed
amount.8 3 By replacing the word "disputed" with "contingent" a substitu-
tion which is by no means unreasonable, the Steen court could have afforded
the taxpayer the relief intended by section 453.
C. The Effect of the Decision on the Taxpayer
The consequences of the Steen decision can best be illustrated by
comparing the taxpayer's resulting liability, first, with that which would
have followed from a holding that the contingency payment was ordinary
income because the two contracts should not be integrated and, second,
with that which would have ensued had the court integrated the contracts
without precluding recourse to section 453.84 The following hypothetical
computations apply 1977 tax law,8 5 including the tax preference pro-
visions, 6 and are designed to calculate how many 1977 dollars must be
set aside in order to pay the total tax liability arising from the sale trans-
action as it becomes due.
87
82. 286 U.S. 417 (1932). In North American Oil, the taxpayer was not required
to report as income on 1916 profits which were paid to a receiver in 1916 but which
were not payable to the taxpayer until 1917. Id. at 423.
83. 52 T.C. at 895.
84. This could be accomplished either by finding the contingent amount relatively
de minimis or by treating it as a nonmandatory element of the section 453 computa-
tions in accordance with North American Oil. See text accompanying notes 65, 66,
70 & 71 supra. This would yield a result identical to that which Steen had originally
calculated when filing his tax returns. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
85. For illustrative purposes, this Comment assumes that Steen had taxable
income of $100,000 per year, exclusive of the income attributable to the sale of the
Utex stock, but including income attributable to the management contract. See note
51 supra.
Section 1202 permits a deduction of 50% of the long-term capital gain. See
note 50 supra. Additionally, the first $50,000 of long-term capital gain is taxed at
the alternative rate of 25%. See I.R.C. § 1201.
86. Section 56 of the Code provides that a 15% tax is levied on the amount by
which items of tax preference - in this case, Steen's section 1202 deduction - exceed
one-half of the tax liability under all other Code sections or $10,000. I.R.C. § 56.
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 the
tax was levied at the rate of 10% on the amount by which the items of tax preference
exceeded the sum of the tax liability under all other Code sections and $30,000. Tax
Reform Act of 1969, P.L. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 580 (1969) (prior to 1976 amend-
ment).
87. All future taxes are discounted at an annual interest rate of 7%. This assump-
tion and those made in notes 37, 51 & 85 and in the text accompanying notes 85 & 86
supra also apply to the illustrations in notes 113 & 117 infra.
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1. The Liability Under the Steen Holding
[VOL. 22
Gain § 1202 Taxable Present
Amount Recog- Deduc- Portion Value
YearSS Realized89 nized9O tion9 3 of Gain9 4  Tax9 5  of Tax96
1 $10,666,024 $9,666,02491 $4,833,012 $4,833,012 $3,845,720 $3,845,720
9 458,532 445,94292 222,971 222,971 169,212 98,481
Total Present Value of Tax Liability --------------------------...---------.---- $3,944,201
2. If the Court Had Not Integrated the Contracts97
Gain § 1202 Taxable Present
Amount Recog- Deduc- Portion Value
Year Realized nized tion of Gain Tax of Tax
1 $3,196,413 $2,896,589 $1,448,294 $1,448,295 $1,146,408 $1,146,408
2 933,702 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 307,413
3 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 287,028
4 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 268,288
5 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 250,862
6 933,702 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 234,423
7 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 218,970
8 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 204,832
9 1,392,233 1,292,063 423,060 869,003 617,532 359,404
Total Present Value of Tax Liability -------------------- $3,277,628
88. See note 37 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
90. See notes 1 & 47 supra.
91. Amount realized of $10,666,024 minus adjusted basis of $1,000,000. See
note 47 supra.
92. Contingency payment of $458,532 minus the $12,590 basis therein. See
note 48 supra.
93. Fifty percent of the gain recognized. See note 50 supra.
94. Gain recognized less section 1202 deduction is the taxable portion of the gain.
95. See notes 51, 85 & 86 supra.
96. See note 87 supra.
97. The effect of this approach is to treat the contingency as ordinary income in
the year of receipt. This is also the National Farmers Union approach (see note 15
supra), and is the result which the Steen court would have reached had it accepted
the Commissioner's initial assertion. See 509 F.2d at 1401.
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol22/iss1/7
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
3. The Liability Under the Method Employed by the Taxpayer9 8
Gain § 1202 Taxable Present
Amount Recog- Deduc- Portion Value
Year Realized nized tion of Gain Tax of Tax
1 $3,196,413 $2,896,589 $1,448,294 $1,448,295 $1,146,408 $1,146,408
2 933,702 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 307,413
3 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 287,028
4 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 268,288
5 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 250,862
6 933,702 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 234,423
7 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 218,970
8 933,701 846,121 423,060 423,061 328,784 204,832
9 1,392,233 1,292,063 646,031 646,032 506,603 294,843
Total Present Value of Tax Liability ....... ------------------------- -. - - --- $3,213,067
The result attained by application of the latter approach would be
consistent with the Tax Court's construction of section 453 adopted in
Rushing,9 9 whereas the former alternative represents a result which would
follow from the method of reporting used in National Farmers Union.100
As the foregoing calculations demonstrate, application of the Steen rationale
requires the taxpayer to pay immediately 20% more in taxes during the
year of the sale than he receives in cash. 10 ' This result is seemingly incon-
sistent with both the congressional intent underlying section 453102 and
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Logan.1 3 The inequity is further high-
lighted when it is observed that had the court merely accepted the Com-
missioner's initial assertion that capital gain treatment should not have
been given to the contingent payment, the present value of the tax liability
would have increased only 1.8%,104 whereas under the eventual disposition
of the case the present value of Steen's tax liability increased 22.7%. 105
98. Using section 453 installment accounting, and reporting the net amount of
the contingency as long-term capital gain in the year of receipt. This is also the
North American Oil/Rushing approach. See notes 81 & 82 and accompanying text
supra.
99. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
100. See notes 14 & 15 supra.
101. The total first year tax liability is $3,845,720 on a downpayment of $3,196,413.
See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
104. Compare table in text accompanying note 97 supra with table in text accom-
panying note 98 supra.
105. Compare table in text accompanying note 88 supra with table in text accom-
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IV. PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL REMEDIES
A. Justification for Congressional Action
Since the Tax Court's reasoning conflicts with that of two circuit
courts of appeals, 10 6 it can be anticipated that the Commissioner, bolstered
by the Gralapp and Steen decisions, will scrutinize section 453 elections
even more carefully. The probable result - a flurry of conflicting de-
cisions 07 - can be avoided if Congress amends section 453 to provide
some flexibility in the definition of the "total contract price." In the alter-
native, congressional inaction might be judicially interpreted as acquiescence
in the Steen and Gralapp decisions; the subsequent adoption of the Steen
rationale by the other circuits would cause inequities similar to those
illustrated above.
Any legislative reform~hlation of section 453 should be directed toward
extending the installment accounting provisions to sellers in open trans-
actions, while at the same time discouraging abuse by making the use of
contingency provisions expensive.' 08 It is suggested that Congress could
adopt a de minimus exception, an annuity approach, or ordinary income/
long-term capital loss treatment.
B. The Proposals
1. De minimus Exception
This proposal, which reflects the Gralapp dictum,10 9 permits a tax-
payer to use section 453 even if the contract contains a contingency,
provided that the conditional amount does not exceed 5% of the total
contract price. The taxpayer would report the contingent amount as
long-term capital gain in the year of receipt. This approach, demonstrated
above,"10 is the one taken by the taxpayer in Steen; it is also consistent
with the Tax Court's resolution of the Rushing case."'
106. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
107. For a study of the judicial contribution to tax complexity, see generally
Roberts, Friedman, Ginsburg, Louthan, Lubick, Young & Zeitlin, A Report on Com-
plexity and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REv. 325, 351-60 (1972).
108. This would be consistent with the policy of ensuring that the Treasury does
not incur large revenue losses when taxpayers change their methods of accounting.
See I.R.C. § 453 (c) ; note 24 and accompanying text supra.
109. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
110. See illustration at text accompanying note 98 supra.
111. For a discussion of Rushing, see notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
This approach results in a benefit for the taxpayer because the lower contract
price used in the section 453 computation means that the gross profit percentage will
result in a minimum recognized gain during the precontingency years. For example,
had Steen included the $445,942 contingency payment gain in the total contract price
when he originally adopted the section 453 method of reporting, he would have recog-
nized 90.9% of each dollar received in the precontingency years as income, rather than
the 90.62% actually used. See note 47 supra. This would have increased his taxable
income by approximately $4,300 in the year of the sale.
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2. An Annuity Approach
Under an annuity approach," 2 the seller's adjusted basis in the prop-
erty would be divided by the number of years over which the contract price
is to be paid; the portion of the total consideration received in a particular
year which exceeds the basis allocated to that year would be long-term
capital gain. Any basis not recovered in a particular year would be carried
forward to the subsequent year, increasing the adjusted basis attributable
to amounts received in that year. Should there be any unrecovered basis
after the last year of the contract, the taxpayer could use it to offset other
long-term capital gains which are realized within three years."
3
Under this approach the taxpayer receiving payments under an open
transaction would have advantages similar to those provided by section 453.
Although this method is not entirely consistent with the annuity pro-
visions of section 72 of the Code," 4 it is grounded in the same principles.
Since the annuity section was part of the Supreme Court's rationale in
112. This method was suggested in Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Pay-
ments, A Proposal for Structural Reform, 27 U. So. CAL. 1975 TAx INST. 1, 35.
113. The annuity approach, as applied to the Steen contract, would produce the
following result:
Taxable Present
Amount Gain § 1202 Portion Value
Year Realized Recognized Deduction of Gain Tax of Tax
1 $3,196,413 $3,083,903 $1,541,951 $1,541,952 $1,221,110 $1,221,110
2 933,702 821,192 410,596 410,596 318,843 298,118
3 933,701 821,191 410,595 410,596 318,843 278,350
4 933,701 821,191 410,595 410,596 318,843 260,176
5 933,701 821,191 410,595 410,596 318,843 243,277
6 933,702 821,192 410,596 410,596 318,843 227,335
7 933,701 821,191 410,595 410,596 318,843 212,349
8 933,701 821,191 410,595 410,596 318,843 198,639
9 1,392,233 1,279,723 639,861 639,862 501,683 291,979
Total Present Value of Tax Liability ------------......................... $3,231,333
114. Section 72(b) provides in pertinent part:
Gross income does not include that part of any amount received as an annuity
under an annuity, endowment, or life insurance contract which bears the same
ratio to such amount as the investment in the contract (as of the annuity starting
date) bears to the expected return under the contract (as of such date).
I.R.C. § 72(b). Under the approach offered in the text (see also text accompanying
notes 94 & 95 supra) the basis is applied evenly to each year's receipt in lieu of the
proportionate application of basis required by section 72.
27
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Logan,115 the application of annuity treatment to an open transaction would
be logical and not without some precedent.
3. Ordinary Income/Long-Term Capital Loss Treatment
This approach permits the taxpayer to estimate the total contract price,
which he would then be required to use in the section 453 calculation.
Every dollar received would be allocated proportionally between recovery
of the adjusted basis and long-term capital gain until the adjusted basis
was fully recovered. Thereafter, the taxpayer would be required to report
all additional receipts as ordinary income.11 6 Although shrewd taxpayers
might deliberately estimate an unreasonably high contract price, possibly
foreclosing the full recovery of the adjusted basis, this attempt to avoid
ordinary income treatment could be discouraged by a requirement that any
unrecovered basis after all payments under the contract have been received
must be treated as long-term capital loss.1 1 7
115. 283 U.S. at 413-14. The Court explained: "If a sum equal to the value thus
ascertained had been invested in an annuity contract, payments thereunder would have
been free from income tax until the owner had recouped his capital investment. We
think a like rule should be applied here." Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
116. In effect, this was the result reached in National Farmers Union. See notes
14 & 15 supra. Apparently the value of the contingency in that case was estimated to
be zero.
117. The following illustrations demonstrate the results of applying the ordinary
income/long-term capital loss approach to the Steen transaction. The first table shows
the calculation of the tax liability using an estimate of $100,000 for the contingency;
the second table is based upon an estimate of $700,000.
1. Using an estimate of $100,000
Taxable Present
Amount Gain § 1202 Portion Value
Year Realized Recognized Deduction of Gain Tax of Tax
1 $3,196,413 $2,895,630 $1,447,815 $1,447,815 $1,146,026 $1,146,026
2 933,702 845,840 422,920 422,920 328,672 307,308
3 933,701 845,840 422,920 422,920 328,672 286,931
4 933,701 845,840 422,920 422,920 328,672 268,196
5 933,701 845,840 422,920 422,920 328,672 250,777
6 933,702 845,840 422,920 422,920 328,672 234,343
7 933,701 845,840 422,920 422,920 328,672 218,896
8 933,701 845,840 422,920 422,920 328,672 204,763
9 1,392,233 1,294,962* 468,215 826,474* 596,944 347,422
Total Present Value of Tax Liability- ........ . . $3,264,662
* $358,532 of this amount is ordinary income, because the taxpayer has underestimated
his contingency by that amount.
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C. Evaluation of the Proposals
It is submitted that each of the foregoing proposals is consistent with
the intent of Congress in enacting section 453 of the Code, and that each
could be incorporated into it either individually or as alternatives to be
elected by the taxpayer." 8 All are designed to discourage abuse by plac-
ing a ceiling on the contingency or by converting into ordinary income
payments received in excess of the estimated total contract price, while
requiring that any unused basis be carried forward as long-term capital
loss. Although none of the proposals would generate the tax revenue
provided by the Steen approach," 9 one can assume that when Congress




A. An Entirely Open Contract
One interim solution which the tax planner should consider in order
to avoid the hazards posed by contracts sirpilar to those under review in
Gralapp and Steen is the use of an entirely open contract.'21 This rather
simplistic approach contemplates making the total contract price conditional
upon the occurrence of some uncertain future event. The seller, necessarily
2. Using an estimate of $700,000
Taxable Present
Amount Gain § 1202 Portion Value
Year Realized Recognized Deduction of Gain Tax of Tax
1 $3,196,413 $2,911,612 $1,455,806 $1,455,806 $1,152,399 $1,152,399
2 933,702 850,509 425,254 425,255 330,534 309,049
3 933,701 850,509 425,254 425,255 330,534 288,556
4 933,701 850,509 425,254 425,255 330,534 269,716
5 933,701 850,509 425,254 425,255 330,534 252,197
6 933,702 850,509 425,254 425,255 330,534 235,671
7 933,701 850,509 425,254 425,255 330,534 220,136
8 933,701 850,509 425,254 425,255 330,534 205,923
9 1,392,233 1,268,185 634,093 634,092 497,082 289,302
Present Value of Tax Liability $3,222,949
The taxpayer would have a long-term capital loss carryforward of $241,468 - the
difference between the estimate of $700,000 and the actual contingent amount received
($458,532).
118. The difference between the proposal which generates the lowest present
value of tax liability and the one yielding the highest is less than 2% when applied to
the Steen transaction. See notes 113 & 117 and text accompanying note 97 supra.
119. See illustration at text accompanying notes 88-96 supra.
120. The Senate report which accompanied the 1954 Code indicated an attempt to
avoid a result similar to that in Steen if the seller received no payment in the year
of sale. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 303 (1954).
121. For a discussion of this approach, see Note, "Open End" Selling Price Bars
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denied section 453 treatment under Steen, is involved in one of those "rare
and extraordinary cases [in which] property [is] considered to have no fair
market value."' 22 Therefore, the seller would be permitted to recover his
entire adjusted basis in the property before recognizing any gain.
The drawbacks of this solution are self-evident. A seller who sur-
renders title to a valuable asset desires a greater assurance of payment
than that provided by an entirely open contract. 128 By making the entire
consideration contingent upon speculative future events, the seller assumes
more of the characteristics attributable to a partner of the buyer, 24 with
liability limited to the value of his asset, 2 5 and loses his similarity to a
seller who has retained a security interest in the asset.128
B. Buyer's Option to Purchase Portion of Property Retained
by the Seller
An alternative interim solution to the problem involves the sale of a
substantial portion of the property for an ascertainable consideration," 27
and the nominal sale of an option to the buyer for the purchase of the
retained portion, 28 exercisable at a future date for a price contingent
upon uncertain future events.'20 The seller would transfer the major
portion of the property in exchange for an ascertainable payment, enabling
him to use section 453, while retaining an ownership interest in a small
portion thereof, subject to the option granted. Since the option is exer-
cisable by the buyer alone, the Commissioner would have difficulty con-
vincing a court to accept the integration rationale of Steen.
As does the open contract technique, this solution has some serious
drawbacks. By retaining an interest in the property, the seller would, in
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957).
123. Since no tax is due until the adjusted basis has been recovered, the taxpayer
can ensure the recovery of that amount by negotiating a minimum contract price
equivalent to the adjusted basis. Thus, the taxpayer would subject only the potential
profit to the risk inherent in an entirely open contract.
124. Whether a partnership exists is a matter for the trier of fact. See J. CRANE
& R. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 36 (1968).
125. In some instances, the liability of the seller might not be so limited and he
would be exposed to full personal liability. See generally id. at 335-36.
126. If the contingency is based on future profits, and the buyer becomes insolvent,
and is adjudicated a bankrupt, the seller's security interest in the property would be
limited to nonexistent profits; hence, the property would belong to the trustee for dis-
tribution to other creditors. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
792 (1972). See generally Comment, Future Advance Security Systems and the
Federal Tax Lien, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 820 (1970).
127. The consideration could consist of a downpayment of 30% or less and the
balance in obligations of the buyer payable over a period of years. In this manner,
gain from the fixed contract could be reported under section 453. See I.R.C. § 453.
128. The retained portion could be physically severable from the rest of the
property, or the seller could continue to own the entire property as a tenant in
common with the buyer.
129. The contingency could be based upon future profits of the buyer, the rate
of inflation, or the increase in the value of the entire property.
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effect, become a partner of the buyer in that property's development or use.
He could be exposed to both torf and contract liability. The purchaser
would be saddled with a partner who would be required to join in mort-
gage contracts, insurance agreements, and conveyances. If the parties
tried to avoid some of these problems by arranging for the seller to give
the buyer a power of attorney or relinquish his control over the asset
through some other device, the option would tend to merge into the sale
and the danger of a Steen type integration would become imminent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The immediate effect of the Steen and Gralapp decisions could be to
discourage sellers of real estate or mineral rights from retaining a small
interest in the future development of the enterprise unless they receive the
full contract price, exclusive of the contingency, in the year of the sale.
Such a result is contrary to the apparent congressional intent underlying
section 453.1s0 This Comment strongly recommends that courts which
have not faced the issue apply the Corn Products"s" and North American
Oil/Rushing13 2 rationales when it arises. More importantly, Congress has
the obligation to define whatever permissible deviation from a fixed sales
price is acceptable for purposes of section 453 of the Code. In the interim,
sellers must carefully structure their transactions so as not to create a tax
liability in the year of the sale which exceeds the amount of cash received.
Harry J.J. O'Neill
LABOR LAW - INJUNCTIONS - FEDERAL COURTS Do NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN A SYMPATHY STRIKE EVEN THOUGH THE
UNION'S RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN SUCH STRIKE Is SUBJECT TO THE
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS OF ITS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers (U.S. 1976)
Buffalo Forge Company (Buffalo Forge), an employer operating
three separate plant and office facilities in the Buffalo, New York area,'
brought an action2 against the United Steelworkers of America3 (Union),
130. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 78 & 79 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
1. Buffalo Forge Company is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale
of pumps and air-handling equipment. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 386
F. Supp. 405, 407 (W.D.N.Y. 1974). Its three plants are located in Buffalo, Cheek-
towaga, and North Tonawanda, New York. Id.
2. Jurisdiction was based on section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1970). That section provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
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a union representing some of its employees, for an alleged breach of its
collective bargaining agreement.4 For several years prior to the lawsuit,
the Union had represented the production and maintenance (P & M)
employees 5 at all three facilities, and in the summer of 1974, the Union
was also certified as the representative of the office and technical (0 & T)
employees. 0 Thereafter, in the course of attempting to negotiate their first
collective bargaining agreement, the 0 & T employees, on November 16,
1974, went out on strike and established picket lines at all three plants."
Within five days of the picket lines' formation the P & M employees also
struck at the Union's direction.
8
Buffalo Forge responded to the action of the P & M employees by
filing suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York, alleging that the Union's act of directing the P & M employees
to honor the 0 & T picket lines amounted to a direct violation of an express
no-strike clause contained in their collective bargaining agreement.9 On
the basis of this claim, Buffalo Forge asked the district court for damages,
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Id.
3. The International Union and Local Union Nos. 1874 and 3732 were named
defendants in this action. Local 1874 represented approximately 930 production and
maintenance (P&M) employees at the Buffalo and Cheektowaga plants. Local 3732
represented approximately 83 P&M employees at the North Tonawanda plant. 386 F.
Supp. at 406-07.
4. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3144 (1976).
The contracts between each local and the company contained identical no-strike clauses
as well as grievance and arbitration provisions for settling disputes over the inter-
pretation and application of each contract. The no-strike clause (section 14b of the
contract) provided in part: "There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption
or impeding of work. No officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize,
instigate, aid or condone any such activity." Id. at 3143 n.1.
This pledge was repeated in connection with the grievance procedure in
section 26 of the contract: "Should differences arise between the Company and any
employee covered by this agreement as to the meaning of and application of the pro-
visions of this agreement, or should any trouble of any kind arise in the plant, there
shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences ...... Id. at 3143.
The final section dealing with the grievance procedure, section 32, provided:
"In the event the grievance involves a question as to the meaning and application of
the provisions of this Agreement, and has not been previously satisfactorily adjusted,
it may be submitted to arbitration upon written notice of the Union or the Company."
Id. at 3144 n.2.
5. Id. at 3143.




9. 386 F. Supp. at 407. Buffalo Forge argued alternatively that the strike was
the result of a dispute between the company and a group of drivers concerning the
propriety of certain work assignments. Id. The district court found that there was
insufficient evidence to support that allegation. Id. at 409. This finding was not
challenged on appeal. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207,
1211 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975).
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an order to submit any underlying disputes to the contractual arbitration
procedure, and a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
against the strike, pending the outcome of the arbitration.1"
The district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction,"
finding that the P & M employees' strike was not caused by a dispute
over issues which were subject to arbitration 12 and, therefore, was not
within the narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act,13 articulated in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770.14 In affirming the district
court's holding' 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
emphasized the fact that the narrow holding in Boys Markets could not be
expanded to cover this situation without "virtually obliterating the policy
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."' 6 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court
of the United States affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit, holding
that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to enjoin a sympathy strike
even though the Union's right to engage in such a strike is subject to the
arbitration provisions of its collective bargaining agreement. Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
The power of the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes
has been a matter of passionate controversy for over eighty years.17 The
10. 96 S. Ct. at 3144.
11. 386 F. Supp. at 410.
12. Id. at 409.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970). Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act pro-
vides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person .. . from . .. doing any of the following acts:
(a) ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remaini in any relation
of employment;
(e) giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) assembling peacefully to act . . . in promotion of their interests in a
labor dispute.
Id. § 104.
14. 398 U.S. 235 (1970), noted in 16 VILL. L. REV. 176 (1970). In Boys Markets,
an employer sought an injunction against a union strike and picketing which were
allegedly in violation of the arbitration and no-strike provisions of the employees'
collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court held that a federal court could
issue an injunctive order against a strike if the court first found that the parties were
contractually bound to arbitrate the dispute and that the ordinary principles of equity
would warrant such relief. Moreover, the Court said that the employer should be
ordered to arbitrate as a condition to obtaining the injunction. Id. at 254.
15. On appeal, the parties stipulated that the district court's findings of fact were
correct. The pertinent findings were as follows: 1) the 0 & T employees' strike and
picket line were "bona fide, primary and legal"; 2) the Union had authorized and
directed the P & M employees' work stoppage; and 3) although the P & M em-
ployees' strike had ended, it might resume at any time in the near future. 96 S. Ct.
at 3145.
16. 517 F.2d at 1211.
17. For a discussion of the history and development of the legal theories involved,
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controversy inspired several congressional attempts to limit that power' s
culminating with the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. By means of that
Act, Congress completely withdrew the jurisdiction of the federal courts'9
to issue injunctions against several specifically enumerated types of union
activities.
20
For the next thirty-eight years, the federal courts rejected all argu-
ments which sought to limit the effect of this act. 2 1 Ultimately, however,
Boys Markets and National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REV. 93, 94 (1970); Gould,
On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 Sup.
CT. REv. 215, 234-35.
18. Prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress made at least two attempts to
limit the availability of injunctions in labor disputes. In 1913, Congress attached a
provision to an appropriations bill for the Department of Justice providing that none
of the money was to be "spent in the prosecution of any organization or individual
for entering into any combination or agreement having in view the increasing of
wages, shortening of hours, or bettering the conditions of labor. See F. FRANK-
FURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 17, at 141.
This largely unsuccessful effort was followed in 1914 by a more direct attack
on the legal theory that was most often used as the basis for issuing injunctions.
Congress enacted section 6 of the Clayton Act to prevent the utilization of the antitrust
laws to stifle labor unions. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970). Section 6 of the Clayton Act
states in part:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purpose of mutual help ...or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall
such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
19. The authority of Congress to so limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts was specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in Lauf v. E.G. Skinner &
Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). See also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,
233-34 (1922).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). In addition to those activities listed in note 13 supra,
the Act also forbids injunctions against:
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization ....
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insur-
ance, or other monies or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in
any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action
or suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts
heretofore specified; and
(h) Advising, urging or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified. ...
Id. § 104. The Act also set up strict procedural requirements to be followed before
an injunction could be issued against any other labor activity not specifically exempt.
Id. § 107.
21. Attempts were made in several different contexts to limit the effect of the
Act by narrowly defining the term "labor dispute," as used in section 104. See notes
13 & 20 supra. This type of argument was rejected in Lauf v. E.G. Skinner & Co.,
[VOL. 22'
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in the Boys Markets case, the Supreme Court reversed an earlier decision
that was directly on point22 and concluded that, despite the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a federal court did have jurisdiction to issue
an injunction against a union strike, when the strike resulted from a griev-
ance that the union was contractually bound to arbitrate.23 The Court's
complete reversal in position was justified both on the basis of the need to
accommodate the congressional policy favoring arbitration with the policy
behind the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and on
the basis of the need to develop a uniform national labor law.24 Following
that decision, the courts of appeals divided on the question of whether a
Boys Markets injunction was proper when the right to strike was the only
arbitrable issue.
25
303 U.S. 323, 329 (1938), and Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 199 (1962)
(overruled in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)).
One exception to this pattern was a line of cases culminating in the decision
in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
In that case, the Supreme Court held that a federal court did have jurisdiction to issue
an injunction against a strike by a railway labor union over disputes pending before
the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The holding was based upon the Court's
finding that section 3 of the Railway Labor Act, which provided for arbitration of dis-
putes, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970), applied, thereby requiring an accommodation between
that Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act in order to preserve the clear purpose of each
statute. 353 U.S. at 40.
22. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). In Sinclair, an em-
ployer sought an injunction against a union strike and picketing which allegedly
violated the no-strike provision of their collective bargaining agreement. 370 U.S.
at 197. The Supreme Court held that the action was barred in the federal court by the
anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, despite the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration. Id. at 213-15.
23. 398 U.S. at 254.
24. Id. at 241.
25. The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits adopted the view that the employer's
right to an injunction was as broad as the grievance and arbitration clauses contained
in their collective bargaining agreements. Based upon this view, they allowed injunc-
tions against sympathy strikes upon a showing that 1) the dispute over the right to
strike was covered by the arbitration agreement and 2) the injunction was war-
ranted under the traditional equitable standards. See, e.g., Valmac Indus. v. Food
Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 3215 (1976) ;
Associated Gen. Contractors v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 519 F.2d
269 (8th Cir. 1975); Island Creek Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 507 F.2d 650
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); NAPA
Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs, Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974), noted in 21 VILL. L. REV. 608 (1975);
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits adopted a more restricted view. Those
circuits uniformly agreed that an additional requirement for the issuance of an in-
junction was a showing that the strike was "over" an arbitrable dispute. See Plain
Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied: 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976) ; Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
The Seventh Circuit allowed an injunction to issue against a sympathy strike
in one case where there was an "exceptionally broad" arbitration clause, Inland Steel
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In order to resolve this split among the circuits, the Supreme Court
had to delineate the limits of the Boys Markets decision. The Court, con-
sequently, found it necessary, first, to review briefly the policy reasons
behind the limited exception set forth in the Boys Markets decision. 26 The
Court asserted that the narrow accommodation of section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act to section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act,27
which had been articulated in Boys Markets, could be justified only on the
basis of the strong congressional preference for privately agreed upon dis-
pute settlement mechanisms.
28
Having thus explained the Boys Markets case, the Court 29 proceeded
to distinguish the instant factual situation from the Boys Markets situation.
The distinction was drawn between a strike that was "precipitated by a
dispute . . . subject to binding arbitration under the provisions of the
contract,"30 as was the case in Boys Markets,31 and a strike "in support of
sister unions negotiating with the employer," which precipitated an arbi-
trable dispute as to whether or not the strike violated the collective bar-
gaining agreement as was the case in Buffalo Forge.32 Reasoning that in
the latter case the cause of the strike and the issues underlying it were
not even subject to the arbitration provisions of the contract,33 the Court
concluded that such a strike could not be deemed to have had the purpose
or effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate thereby rendering
Boys Markets inapposite.
34
The Court next rejected the employer's argument that an injunction
was warranted merely because it had been alleged that the strike violated
the express no-strike provision of the contract.3 5 Although it agreed that
section 301 had created a "major role" for the federal courts in enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements, the Court dismissed the con-
tention that this role included the authority to enjoin actual or threatened
contract violations except where it involved the enforcement of arbitration
provisions.3 6 The Court supported this position by pointing out that, in
to issue injunctions in two other cases where the language of the arbitration clause
was not as broad. See Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3220 (1976) ; Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB,
511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
26. 96 S. Ct. at 3146-47.
27. 29 U.S.C.§ 185(a) (1970).
28. 96 S. Ct. at 3148-49; see text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra. As the
Court noted, this congressional policy is articulated in 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). 96 S. Ct.
at 3149.
29. Justice White, the author of the majority opinion, dissented in Boys Markets
for the reasons stated in Sinclair, 398 U.S. at 261 (dissenting opinion).
30. 96 S. Ct. at 3146.
31. See note 14 supra.
32. 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
33. Id. The cause of the strike was the strike by the 0 & T employees. The
issues underlying it were the contractual demands of the 0 & T employees. Id.
34. Id.
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the course of enacting the Labor-Management Relations Act, Congress had
rejected a proposal to lift the Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against
injunctions in suits brought to enforce collective bargaining agreements."
In addition, the Court quoted from the dissent in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson 3 adopted in Boys Markets, to the effect that, in suits for contract
violations brought under section 301, the anti-injunction policy of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act should prevail unless the violation also threatened
some additional public policy. 39
Applying this analysis to the facts, the Court explained that the ex-
istence of the arbitrable issue of the right to engage in the sympathy strike
was not a sufficient reason to override the express anti-injunction provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.40 The majority expressed concern that a
contrary holding would encourage the use of injunctions against a great
variety of alleged breaches of contract despite the fact that the injunctions
would otherwise violate the express prohibitions of section 104.41 Such an
extension of the Boys Markets exception was viewed as a serious under-
mining of the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
42
Finally, the Court noted that an injunctive order in a sympathy strike
situation would unavoidably involve a "judicial preview" of the facts and
law involved in a dispute and could thus potentially undermine private
arbitration agreements 43 by exerting a significant influence on the arbi-
trator's eventual decision.
4 4
In a dissenting opinion,45 Justice Stevens rejected what he claimed
were the bases of the majority opinion. 46 He then argued that the Boys
37. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history, see Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkin-
son, 370 U.S. 195, 205-08, 216-24 (1962).
38. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
39. 96 S. Ct. at 3148, quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 225
(1962) (dissenting opinion).
40. 96 S. Ct. at 3148-49.
41. Id.; see notes 13 & 20 supra.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 3148-49.
43. Id. Referring to the grievance procedures, the Court commented: "Nowhere
does it provide for coercive action of any kind, let alone judicial injunctions, short of
the terminal decision of the arbitrator. The parties have agreed to grieve and arbi-
trate, not to litigate." Id. at 3149.
44. Id. This "judicial preview" problem does not arise in the traditional Boys
Markets case because the arbitrable dispute and the contract violation which allows
the employer to obtain an injunction are separable. By contrast, in the Buffalo Forge
situation the arbitrable issue of the employees right to strike was also the issue which
the district court had to decide before it could issue an injunction.
45. Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion in Boys Markets, and
Justices Marshall and Powell joined in Justice Stevens' dissent.
46. 96 S. Ct. at 3150. In Justice Stevens' view, the "principal bases" of the
majority opinion were a literal interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and a
fear that the federal judiciary would interfere drastically with the business of contract
interpretation, heretofore reserved for arbitrators. He argued that the first basis was
without merit because it had been "repeatedly rejected in cases in which the central
concerns of the Act were not implicated." Id. Justice Stevens felt that the second
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Markets decision was based not solely upon the need to accommodate the
Norris-LaGuardia Act with the congressional policy favoring arbitration,
but also upon several other compelling factors.4 7 While Justice Stevens
admitted that not all of these factors were equally compelling in the Buffalo
Fdrge situation, he obviously felt that the decision should, nevertheless,
be the same.48 However, recognizing the fact that federal judges were
probably less expert in this area of contract interpretation than arbitrators
would be, he suggested that injunctions should be issued only when the no-
strike clause clearly applied. 9 This last suggestion was specifically rejected
by the majority.50
implicitly rejected in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974),
noted in 19 VILL. L. REv. 655 (1974). 96 S. Ct. at 3150.
In Gateway Coal, the Supreme Court held that the presumption in favor of
the arbitrability of disputes extended to disputes over safety matters. 414 U.S. at 382.
Justice Stevens' "implicit rejection" argument is seemingly based upon the fact that the
injunction was allowed despite the fact that the legality of the strike under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement was also at issue. Id.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 3150-55. According to Justice Stevens' analysis, five prime
reasons existed for the holding in Boys Markets. The first was the Court's con-
clusion that an injunction enforcing a contractual agreement to arbitrate was not one
of the abuses at which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed. Id. at 3151. This con-
clusion was drawn from the declaration of policy stated in section 102 of the Act
itself. That policy statement illustrates that the primary purpose of the act is to
protect labor's ability to organize and bargain collectively. Id., citing 29 U.S.C. § 102
(1932). The second reason for the Boys Markets decision was alleged to be the need
to give effect to the policies expressed in section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act. 96 S. Ct. at 3152. The purpose of that section was to encourage collective
bargaining agreements by making them mutually enforceable. In order to effectuate
this goal, the Boys Markets Court found it necessary to make available to the em-
ployer the principal and most expeditious method of enforcing a no-strike agreement,
i.e., an injunction. Id. The third reason was the precedent established in another
line of cases wherein the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had not been given
controlling effect. Id. at 3153. That line of cases culminated in a holding that a
federal court could enjoin a strike by a railroad union over a dispute subject to man-
datory arbitration under the Railway Labor Act. See note 21 supra. The fourth reason
was the conflict between the availability of injunctive relief in federal courts and
state courts. 96 S. Ct. at 3154. This conflict resulted from the Supreme Court's
decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), which held that a
section 301 action instituted in a state court could properly be removed to a federal
court. Many employers, therefore, found that the former remedy of injunction avail-
able in the state courts had been effectively eliminated by the passage of section 301 of
the Labor-Management Relations Act. This incongruous result was at odds with
congressional intent not to allow the passage of section 301 to disturb the preexisting
jurisdiction of the state courts. 96 S. Ct. at 3155; see 92 CONG. REC. 5708 (1946)
(remarks of Sen. Murray). The final reason asserted by Justice Stevens for the
Boys Markets decision was the strong federal policy favoring settlement of labor
disputes by arbitration, and therefore also favoring the enforceability of private agree-
ments to arbitrate. 96 S. Ct. at 3155.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 3155-57. His conclusion was predicated upon his view of the
purpose of the arbitration process. That purpose was the removal of any ambiguity
in the collective bargaining agreement as it applied to an unforeseen set of facts.
Id. at 3156. Since the decision of the arbitrator which removed that ambiguity was
enforceable by injunction, he felt that an unambiguous clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement which clearly covered the situation should also be enforceable by
injunction. Id.
49. Id. at 3158.
50. Id. at 3149.
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The majority's opinion is susceptible to several criticisms in addition
to those noted by the dissent. The entire decision rests on the premise
that the strike in the instant case is distinguishable from the Boys Markets
strike insofar as a sympathy strike has neither the purpose nor the effect
of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate. 51 In fact, however, this
contention may not be valid.
The key to the distinction was the Court's observation that neither
the cause of nor the issue underlying the strike was subject to arbitration.
52
While this observation may support the contention that the strike was not
employed for the purpose of evading an obligation to arbitrate, it does not
support the contention that the strike would not have the practical effect
of evading such an obligation. The economic pressure inherent in a sym-
pathy strike could force an employer to concede the nonarbitrable issues
underlying the strike long before the arbitrable issue of the right to strike
could be decided by the arbitrator.5 3 In such a case, the employer would
generally have no incentive to pursue arbitration.5 4 The resulting frustra-
tion and interference with the arbitration agreement would be more subtle
than in the typical Boys Markets situation, but would, nevertheless, still be
present.
This was not the only aspect of the issue which the majority ap-
parently declined to consider. Certainly, the Court was correct in asserting
two facts: the simple allegation that a strike is a breach of contract is
insufficient in itself to warrant an injunction;15 and Congress had rejected
a proposal to lift the prohibition against labor dispute injunctions to the
extent necessary to achieve the purpose of enforcing collective bargaining
agreements. Indeed, both of these facts had already been at least im-
plicitly recognized by the Boys Markets Court.57 The Boys Markets Court,
however, extended the analysis beyond these bare indications of an anti-
51. Id. at 3147.
52. Id.
53. As the majority acknowledged, the issue of the applicability of the no-strike
clause to the sympathy strike was subject to arbitration under the provisions of the
contract. Id. at 3146.
54. Continuation of the action by the employer after the dispute has been elimi-
nated will generally only tend to further disturb labor relations. The employer is
thus forced to decide if the benefits to be derived from a possible award of damages
are sufficient to justify the risk of inciting further labor disputes. See Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
55. 96 S. Ct. at 3148. Unless there is a dispute which both parties are bound to
arbitrate, no injunction can be issued against a strike regardless of the fact that it is
a breach of contract. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 254 (1970).
56. 96 S. Ct. at 3148, citing Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-0s,
216-24 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
57. The Boys Markets Court seemed to recognize the legislative history of
section 301 both when it rejected the respondent's stare decisis argument, 398 U.S. at
240, and when it adopted the dissenting opinion in Sinclair. 398 U.S. at 249, citing
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 235 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
The Court expressly recognized the breach of contract argument in its holding in
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injunction policy, and found it necessary to try to accommodate the policies
embodied in section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with those of section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.58
By contrast, the Buffalo Forge Court refused to consider such an
accommodation." Its refusal was derived primarily from its view of the
strike as having no effect upon the arbitration process. 0° When the strike
is viewed in terms of its actual practical effect upon the arbitration process, 6'
however, this belief seems unfounded. The Boys Markets Court willingly
attempted to accommodate the two statutes precisely because it found that
an injunction, protecting the integrity of a private arbitration agreement,
would not undermine the central policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
6 2
The majority in Buffalo Forge declared, moreover, that the policy
favoring arbitration dictated that no injunction be issued in the instant
case. 3 First, the Court argued that the arbitration process would be
frustrated by the issuance of an injunction because it would involve a
decision by the federal court as to the merits of the factual and legal
issues.64 This prior disposition on the merits, in the Court's view, could
so heavily influence the subsequent arbitrator that the dispute would effec-
tively be decided at the preliminary injunction stage. 65 In addition, the
Court noted that the injunction could frustrate the arbitration process
because the time and expense involved in relitigating the issue before the
arbitrator might discourage the losing party from pursuing the arbitra-
tion. 6 While both of these arguments present valid considerations, it is
submitted that the majority placed little, if any, weight upon the fact that
the refusal to issue an injunction presents at least as great a threat that
the arbitration process will be frustrated by the strike-induced capitulation
of the employer.
6 7
Oddly enough, the Court did not emphasize the particular facts of
Buffalo Forge even though such an emphasis would have lent additional
support to their reasoning. Unlike the traditional Boys Markets situation,
this case involved two distinct strikes. Since the 0 & T employees' strike
58. 398 U.S. at 249.
59. 96 S. Ct. at 3148.
60. The Court stated that accommodation was necessary only when a strike
would interfere with and frustrate the arbitration process. Id. at 3149. The majority
also argued that an accommodation should not be attempted because it might lead to
a tremendous expansion in the availability of injunctions and such a result would
be unacceptable because it would cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Id. at 3150.
61. See notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
62. 398 U.S. at 253.
63. 96 S. Ct. at 3149.
64. Id. at 3148-49.
65. Id. at 3149.
66. Id.
67. See notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
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was clearly beyond the reach of an injunction,68 an injunction against that
strike would certainly be inconsistent with the central purpose of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.69 Moreover, an injunction against the P & M
employees' sympathy strike would detrimentally affect the strength of the
0 & T employees' strike. Thus, to the extent that the injunction would
affect the 0 & T employees' strike, it would arguably tend to frustrate
the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Simply because the Court failed to recognize and deal with these
issues does not necessarily mean that its decision is unsupportable. For
while it seems that some question exists as to the validity of the Court's
conclusion that an injunction in this case would seriously undermine the
validity of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,70 at the same time it is not clear
that the grant of an injunction would be any more effective in protecting
arbitration agreements than this refusal to grant such relief.
71
Nevertheless, the decision agreed upon by the majority creates a
serious problem. One of the justifications for the Boys Markets decision
was the Court's concern with preserving the jurisdiction of the state courts
in section 301 suits involving requests for injunctive relief.7 2 Buffalo
Forge has re-created a situation whereby the existence of federal court
jurisdiction effectively eliminates a remedy - an injunction - which was
formerly available in many state courts.
73
Having lost one remedy, employers in the future will be forced to
search for an alternative course of action. One possible stratagem, already
the subject of some litigation, consists of disciplinary action by the em-
ployer against those employees who engage in a sympathy strike.74 Even
if the strike is not halted by such disciplinary action, it may allow the
employer to argue that the ongoing strike is now, at least partially, "over"
68. Since there was no contract involved at that time, the strike could not be a
breach of contract and there was no contractual obligation to arbitrate anything. See
note 55 supra.
69. The general policy declaration of the act states that it is designed to insure
the right of workers to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining .... " 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
70. See text accompanying notes 53, 54 & 58-62 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 65 & 66 supra.
72. 398 U.S. at 244-46. See also note 47 supra.
73. At the time Boys Markets was decided, injunctive remedies for a breach of
a collective bargaining agreement were available in approximately 36 states. Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 247 n.15.
74. The Seventh Circuit recently held that disciplinary action against workers
who refused to cross a picket line was not an unfair labor practice within the meaning
of either section 8(a) (1) or section 8(a) (3) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3) (1970). The holding was based upon a
finding that the dispute over the interpretation of a picket line clause was arbitrable
and therefore employees had no right to honor the picket line prior to the arbitrator's
decision. NLRB v. Keller-Cresent Co., No. 75-1595 (7th Cir., filed Aug. 2, 1976). In
finding the dispute to be arbitrable the Court had to distinguish its earlier decisions
in Hyster Co. v. Employees Assoc., 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), and Gary Hobart
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the arbitrable grievance of the disciplinary action, and therefore, subject to
an injunction, even under the guidelines set forth in Buffalo Forge.75
Another possible alternative for the employer, at least in some in-
stances, would be the institution of a proceeding with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) to establish an unfair labor practice by the
union.76  An injunction against an unfair labor practice, however, can
seldom, if ever, be obtained through the NLRB in less than five to seven
days. In contrast, a standard Boys Markets injunction can often be ob-
tained in one day.
A final possibility for an employer lies in seeking a specific agreement
from the union that its members will not engage in sympathy strikes, and
a further agreement providing for imnediate arbitration of a dispute as to
the precise nature of any strike.7 7  Such an agreement would probably
not permit an employer to get an immediate injunction since the strike
would still not be "over" an arbitrable grievance, but the expedited pro-
cedure would allow him to obtain an enforceable arbitrator's decision
7 8
within a much shorter period of time.
The importance of these alternative remedies will depend upon the
scope attributed to the Buffalo Forge decision. It is submitted that these
remedies, or other alternative remedies, will be very important since the
analysis adopted by the Court appears to indicate an intention to limit
the availability of a Boys Markets injunction to those cases in which there
is a direct chronological and causal relationship between the arbitrable
dispute and the strike.7 0 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that even this restric-




75. The Court specifically noted that the employer did not challenge the district
court's finding that the P & M employees' strike was not, even in part, a protest
over truck driving assignments. 96 S. Ct. at 3145 n.8.
76. An NLRB remedy would be available if the picket line which was being
honored amounted to a secondary boycott. Secondary boycotts are enjoinable as an
unfair labor practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
77. Such an agreement could probably only be obtained from a union, however,
at the price of some additional concession by the employer.
78. The Buffalo Forge majority acknowledged the fact that an arbitrator's de-
cision would be enforceable by an injunction. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steel-
workers, 96 S. Ct. at 3148.
79. That appears to be the standard the Court has set by the use of the require-
ment that the strike be "over" an arbitrable grievance.
80. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d at 1208. The areas
surrounding this issue will probably continue to produce litigation as well. For ex-
ample, it is uncertain at this point whether, and to what extent, the courts will allow
an employer to "manufacture" the required factual situation. See note 75 and accom-
panying text supra. It is also unclear how the courts will deal with the disparate types
of remedies which are now available in the state and federal courts. As noted previ-
ously, the use of the removal process in conjunction with that disparity can effec-
tively eliminate an existing state remedy. See notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text
supra. The use of the removal process also raises a question as to whether a state
court injunction, issued prior to removal, must be dissolved by a federal court.
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SECURITIES LAW - PENSION PLANS - INTERESTS IN A NONCON-
TRIBUTORY, COMPULSORY EMPLOYEE PENSION PLAN DEEMED SUBJECT
TO THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS.
Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (N.D. Ill. 1976)
Plaintiff, a member of Local 705 Internatioral Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Local 705),
worked for union-covered employers for twenty-two and one-half years.'
Because this employment had been interrupted for several months due to
an involuntary lay off, the trustees of the Local 705 Pension Fund (Pension
Fund) denied plaintiff his pension benefits. 2 Alleging that this denial, as
well as the maintenance and administration of the Pension Fund, violated
section 17(a) 3 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and section 10(b) 4
and rule lOb-5 5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),'
plaintiff filed a class action against the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (IBT),
Local 705, the Pension Fund itself, and several trustees of the Pension
Fund." The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
1. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541, 543 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
2. Id. Each employee participant of the'Pension Fund was subject to an eligibility
rule which required 20 years of continuous employment by the employee before he
would become entitled to pension benefits. Id. at 544.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Section 17(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of any securities ...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to. defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which opera-
ates... as a fraud upon the purchaser.
Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part: "It
shall be unlawful for any person . . . (b) to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules . . . as the Commission may prescribe .. .
Id.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) (rule lob-5 promulgated under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (b) (1970)). Rule lOb-5 largely reiterates the language of section 17(a) with
the additional scope of "fraud or deceit . . . in connection with the purchase or.sale
of any security." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). For text of section 17(a), see
note 3 supra.
6. 410 F. Supp. at 544. Plaintiff contended that defendants' alleged sale of inter-
ests in the Pension Fund to employee participants of the fund involved fraudulent and
intentional misrepresentations and omissions by failing to disclose material facts con-
cerning the length and continuity of employment rules. Id.
Plaintiff also alleged violations of sections 302(c) (5) and (e) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(c) (5), (e) (1970), and pendant claims of
common law fraud, deceit, and breach of trust. 410 F. Supp. at 543.
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jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,8
holding that the complaint alleged the sale9 of a security'0 for purposes of
the antifraud provisions" of the 1933 and 1934 Acts (collectively Securities
Acts). Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp.
541 (N.D. Ill. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1855 (7th Cir. Sept. 1,
1976).
The dismissal of defendants' motions represented a departure by the
Daniel court from the standard position of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)' 2 and the consensus of legal thought,13 which pre-
viously has held that becoming entitled to an interest in a noncontributory,'
14
compulsory 5 pension plan does not constitute the sale of a security for
purposes of the Securities Acts. In 1941, SEC Commissioner Purcell
stated that the 1934 Act did not apply to pension plans financed solely
by employer contributions because interests in such plans were giftlike,
and therefore did not constitute a sale to the employee of anything.'
6
8. Id. at 545-46. Defendants argued that Congress' enactment of legislation
specifically designed to handle employee pension funds demonstrates congressional
belief in the inapplicability of the Securities Acts to such funds; and that the SEC
has determined that no sale of a security is involved in noncontributory, compulsory
employee pension plans. Id. at 546. Defendants also contended that the complaint
was barred by the state statute of limitations, id. at 544, citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
121-'A, § 137.13(D) (West Supp. 1976), and that there was a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the
National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 554.
9. Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act provides: "The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include
every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value."
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970). The 1934 Act defines "sale" in a substantially similar
manner. See 1934 Act, § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(14) (1970).
10. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act provides: "When used in this subchapter, unless
the context otherwise requires - (1) the term 'security' means any note, stock ...
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement ... investment
contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
'security'...." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1970).
The 1934 Act contains a substantially similar definition of the term
"security." See 1934 Act, § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970).
11. See notes 3-5 supra.
12. See notes 16 & 18 infr,
However, it should be noted that in January 1977 the SEC reportedly "lined
up behind Daniel" in asserting its jurisdiction over such case despite objections by
the Lab. Dept. and SEC Chairman Hill. Pension Cheating Charged. Phila. Sun
Bulletin, Jan. 23, 1977, § lb, app. 1, col. 6.
13. See note 17 infra.
14. A "noncontributory" pension plan is one in which the employer bears the total
financial burden, as opposed to a contributory plan where there is joint financing by
the employer and the employee. PENSIONS: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS 30 (D. McGill
ed. 1955).
15. A "compulsory" pension plan is one in which there is an "automatic deduction
from salary which is compulsory in the sense that it is an incident of the job and is
accepted as part of the job." Feldman & Rothschild, Executive Compensation and
Federal Securities Legislation, 55 MIcH. L. REV. 1115, 1124-25 (1956-57) (footnote
omitted).
16. Hearings on Proposed Amendments to Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 907 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings]. The
SEC reasoned that these interests were giftlike because the employees were deemed to
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Purcell added that when membership in a pension plan was compulsory,
in the sense that it was a condition of employment, no voluntary invest-
ment decision has been made by the employee,IT and therefore no reason
existed to require compliance with the registration process of the Securities
Acts.18
In 1948, the Seventh Circuit recognized that interests in a pension
fund were not gifts,19 but rather, were "wages". within the definition of
section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act,20 and therefore subject
to collective bargaining.2 1 Although the line of cases following this theory
-
1
have made no payments for them. Id. at 908. In addition, Commissioner Purcell
stated that the Securities Acts did apply to pension plans which involved the sale of
a security. Id.
17. Id. Existing legal thought supports the SEC's view that the employee who
had to either take pension benefits or quit was not exercising his volition in the manner
contemplated by the Securities Acts. See Hipple & Harkelroad, Anomalies of SEC
Enforcement: Two Areas of Concern, 24 EMORY L.J. .697, 705 (1975). See also
Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and
Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW & CONTEMI'. PROB. 795, 807-10 (1964).
18. 1941 Hearings, supra note 16, at 908, 950. Commissioner Purcell reasoned
as follows:
The purpose of the registration process of the Securities Acts is to disclose to
prospective investors the essential facts about securities which they are asked
to buy, and if the employees are given no choice as to whether to buy or refuse
to buy there hardly seems any point in the registration process.
Id. at 950.
19. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949). The Inland Steel court reasoned that an employee's interest in a
pension plan differed from a mere gift because the interest represented a portion of
the employee's remuneration for services performed, and, thus, was part of the reason
he chose a particular job. 170 F.2d at 253. See also NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co.,
199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
20. 29 U.S.C.§ 159(a) (1970).
21. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251. (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949). One court has noted that a noncontributory, unilaterally imposed
pension plan is no less compulsory in nature than a plan bargained for by a union.
See Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 343 (D. Minn. 1967).
Historically, three broad theories on the nature of pension plans have existed.
They have been variously described as gifts, unilateral contracts, and deferred wages.
B. AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER PRIVATE PENSION
PLANS 4-14 (1961). The gift category, chronologically the earliest, was based upon
the reasoning that pensions were no more than gratuities, lacking legal enforceability
by the employee-donee. Id. at 5-9. The contract theory held that a pension plan was
the employer's binding obligation to deliver the pension, generally to the employee
who knew of the plan and continued his employment in reliance upon it. Id. at 9-10.
The third category viewed pensions as wages deferred until a later date; the employee
was deemed to have had the choice between an immediate wage increase and a
pension plan, and having decided on the pension plan, was entitled to view the benefits
as deferred compensation. Id. at 10-14. This final category drew much of its support
from the Inland Steel decision. Id.
Another theory, which could be classified as a subcategory of gifts, held that
pensions were no more than human depreciation, and that the employer owed a moral
obligation to his employees to provide for full depreciation of the employee in the
form of old age pensions. PENSIONS: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS 28 (D. McGill ed. 1955),
citing STEEL INDUSTRY BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE LABOR DISPUTE IN THE BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY 55 (Sept. 10, 1949).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952)
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implicitly suggested that an acquisition of such an interest was a "dis-
position . . . for value," 28 , the SEC has continued to maintain it no-sale
stance.
24
Concurrently with the development of the SEC's firm no-sale position
regarding interests in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan, Con-
gress enacted massive pension legislation,2 5 culminating in the compre-
hensive Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) .26
Against the background of this longstanding SEC position and the
proliferation of comprehensive pension reform legislation, the instant case
was the first federal decision 1) to consider the extent to which an interest
in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan involved the sale of a
security within the meaning of the Securities Acts in light of the recent
enactment of ERISA and other pension legislation, and 2) to consider
the applicability of the protections of the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Acts to interests in such plans.
Focusing upon the legislative history and remedial nature of the
Securities Acts, the court began its analysis with a brief discussion of
whether the Securities Acts were facially applicable to employee pension
plans. In deciding this issue the court examined the legislative history of
the Securities Acts, 27 and concluded that the history disclosed both con-
be noted that opinions which appear to disagree with the Inland Steel decision were
generally concerned that a cause of action would arise under an unjust enrichment or
unilateral contract theory, and not under a deferred wages theory. See, e.g., Connell
v. United States Steel Corp., 516 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1975); Knoll v. Phoenix Steel
Corp., 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973).
23. The concept of a "disposition ... for value" is derived from the definition
of "sale" in the 1933 Act. For the text section, see note 10 supra.
24. See [1962] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.52.
One commentator has :suggested that the SEC's no-sale stance was not based
upon the theory that the interest in the pension plan was acquired without value in
the common law sense, but rather that the employee must either accept pension rights
or quit. Mundheim & Henderson, supra note 17, at 807. It is submitted, however, that
the SEC's position has continued to be based substantially upon the noncontributory,
not the compulsory, aspect of these benefit plans. Although the decisions in this area
have generally dealt with employee stock option and profit-sharing plans, they have
reflected the SEC's no-sale position towards all types of noncontributory, compulsory
employee benefit plans. See, e.g., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) [ 80,443. For an excellent discussion of the no-sale position with respect to
stock option and profit-sharing plans, see Hipple & Harkleroad, supra note 17, at 705-07.
25. E.g., Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, §§ 1-52, 54 Stat. 789 (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a1 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975) ; Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, §§ 2-12, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed
1975); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§
1-4082, 88 Stat. 829 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975)).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975). It should be noted that Congress
enacted ERISA in significant measure because of the lack of employee information
and adequate safeguards for the operation of such plans. Id. § 1001. The stated policy
of ERISA was to protect plan participants' interests in benefit plans by requiring dis-
closure, reporting, remedies, and sanctions. Id. § 1001. The coverage of ERISA
extends to any employee benefit plan maintained in interstate commerce. Id. § 1003.
27. 410 F. Supp. at 547. To reach this question the court disposed of two pre-
liminary matters. First, the court responded to defendants' argument that the three-
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gressional and SEC recognition that, to the degree employee pension plans
involved the sale of a security, the Securities Acts applied to such plans. 28
The Daniel court next considered the defendants' contention that the
large-scale enactment by Congress of specialized pension legislation29 evi-
denced a congressional belief that the Securities Acts were inapplicable to
employee pension plans, notwithstanding the fact that such plans might have
satisfied the definition of security within the meaning of the Securities
Acts.30 Rejecting the defendants' interpretation, the court stated that the
prolific amount of pension legislation could be explained by the fact that
pension plans had "unique characteristics" which were inadequately regu-
lated by the Securities Acts, and which therefore required the enactment
of more specialized, complementary regulations. 31 To substantiate this
view, the court observed that ERISA was aimed only at the ongoing
administration of pension plans, as opposed to the "regulation of the cir-
cumstances of entry,"3 2 i.e., the sale of a pension plan interest, with which
the Securities Acts were concerned.
Confronted with the extensive procedural requirements of the pension
laws, the Daniel court next discussed whether the application of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Acts were necessarily precluded by the
existence of this pension legislation.33 In this regard, the court referred
to the savings clauses of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
year state statute of limitations, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 121Y2, § 137.13(D) (West Supp.
1976), barred plaintiff's action since plaintiff was put on notice of the eligibility rules
as early as 1955. 410 F. Supp. at 554-55. The court found that because plaintiff's
mind had been pacified by the union's declaration of concern for his well-being, by
plaintiff's eighth grade education, and by pension information obfuscated by many pages
of small print in ambiguous language, a genuine issue of material fact existed regard-
ing plaintiff's knowledge of the rules. Id. The court declined, therefore, to reach the
statute of limitations issue. Id. at 545. Second, the court found that an implied
private cause of action exists under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b)
(1970). 410 F. Supp. at 546, citing Surovitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596
(7th Cir. 1975), reversed on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
28. 410 F. Supp. at 547-49. The court examined, in particular, a proposed
amendment to the 1933 Act which would have exempted from registration certain
offerings made solely to employees of an issuer. This amendment was rejected in con-
ference because it was felt that employee plan participants required the protection of
the Securities Acts as much as other investors. 410 F. Supp. at 547, citing H.R. REP.
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
29. See note 25 supra. It should be noted that ERISA's coverage did not extend
to the cause of action alleged in the instant case because of the express exclusion by
ERISA of any causes of action, acts, or omissions arising before January 1, 1975.
29 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1).
30. 410 F. Supp. at 547.
31. Id. at 548.
32. Id. In support of this view, the court noted that the sanctions of ERISA
and the 1958 Act criminalized malfeasance only in the administration of the pension
plans. Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639; S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838.
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(1958 Act)3 4 and the Investment Companies Amendment Act of 1970,35
which denied exemption from liability provided by any law affecting
pension plans, and to the House Report on the 1970 Act,36 which stated
that exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Acts
did not mean exemption from the antifraud provisions of those acts. 37
On the basis of this evidence, the court concluded that noncontributory,
compulsory employee pension plans were not beyond the scope of the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts.3 8
The final issue the court faced was whether plaintiff's acquisition of
an interest in the Pension Fund constituted the sale of a security3 9 for
Securities Act purposes.40 Initially, the court had to determine whether
a "security" existed.41 Noting that an investment contract is one of the
terms included in the definition of "security, '42 the court employed the
definition of "investment contract" set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in SEC v. W. J. Howey,43 which required: "A contract, transaction
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of ... a third party . . .44
Finding that the Pension Fund constituted a common enterprise, 45 that
the trustees had sole power of control over the fund, and that profits were
expected in the form of pension benefits, 4 6 the court concluded that plain-
34. Id., citing 29 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1970).
35. 410 F. Supp. at 549, citing 29 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1970). Although the court
failed to mention it, ERISA also contains a savings clause of substantially similar
content. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (Supp. V 1975).
36. 410 F. Supp. at 549, citing H.R. RP. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1970).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
38. 410 F. Supp. at 549. The court also mentioned that the justifications for
exemption from the procedural requirements of the Securities Acts did not constitute
justification for the inapplicability of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts.
Id. As the court noted, "Since these antifraud provisions do not impose an undue
burden on anyone, there is no reason why they should not remain as remedies available
to employees for use in cases where fraud of the kind covered by these sections has
been committed." Id., quoting Mundheim & Henderson, supra note 17 at 814.
39. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
40. 410 F. Supp. at 549-53. The court noted that this issue had to be resolved
because the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts require: 1) the use of the
jurisdictional means, 2) in the making of material misrepresentations, omissions to
state material facts or use of manipulative and fraudulent devices, in connection with
3) a sale of a security. Id. at 549.
41. Id. at 550-51.
42. See note 10 supra.
43. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
44. Id. at 298-99. This formulation "has become a generally accepted definition
of an investment contract." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347, 38 Fed. Reg.
1735 (1973).
The Daniel court also referred to the traditionally acknowledged "need for
a liberal construction of the word 'security'" in order to effectuate the remedial
purpose of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Acts. 410 F. Supp. at 550.
45. 410 F. Supp. at 550-51.
46. Id. at 551.
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tiff's interest in the Pension Fund constituted a security. 47 In support of
this conclusion, the court noted that the Securities Acts were designed to
prevent fraud in the sale of securities and to protect investors. 4  The
Daniel court stated that because pension plan participants have had a great
need for the protection afforded by the Securities Acts, a need not fulfilled
by any of the pension acts,49 the conclusion that an interest in this plan
was a security, was consistent with the remedial nature of the Securities
Acts.50
The court then considered the Securities Acts' definition of "sale" 51
to determine whether that term of art applied to the plaintiff's acquisition
of an interest in his pension plan.52 The court adopted the theory that em-
ployer contributions to pension funds on behalf of employees represented a
large portion of the wages received by employees for services performed. 53
The court noted in this respect that there was no economic difference
between the situation in the instant case and one where an employee re-
ceives the employer's contribution as part of his salary, which the em-
ployee then remits in cash to the pension fund 54 - the latter situation
representing the traditionally acknowledged sale of a security. The court
concluded that the plaintiff had therefore given value for his interest in
the Pension Fund.55
In addition the court stated that since employees must approve the
union-negotiated formula for dividing earnings between pension fund and
salary, the ultimate responsibility for the allocation lies with them. 56 In
the court's view, this vote represented a voluntary investment decision,
5 7
and therefore the SEC policy of finding no voluntary purchase in such
situations was rejected. 58
Despite the realistic approach taken by the Daniel court in finding
the SEC's no-sale position to be untenable, 59 analytical problems remain.
47. Id. at 552.
48. Id. at 551.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 552.
51. See note 9 supra.
52. 410 F. Supp. at 552-53.
53. Id. at 552, citing Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) ; S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
54. 410 F. Supp. at 553.
55. Id., citing Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972) (plaintiff's
performance of services held to satisfy the value requirements of a sale). See also
SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (IN.D. Tex. 1961).
56. 410 F. Supp. at 553.
57. Id. The Daniel court recognized that a majority vote prevailed in union
decisions, but determined "that this did not negate the fact that this majority decision
is but an aggregate of many individual decisions." Id.
58. Id. The court observed that in other circumstances the SEC did not "look
behind the purchase for the state of mind of the investor to determine whether in fact
the purchaser 'desired'" to buy the security, and added that the SEC should not do
so here either. Id.
59. This realistic approach is reflected in the writing of one commentator who
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For example, if the employer's contributions are really no more than wages
deducted from the employee's paycheck, it is difficult to understand why
the employee who leaves his job before his rights have vested has no claim
to that portion of the funds representing his "wages." 60 The court also
did not consider whether an employer who did not want to be "sold" an
interest in the Pension Fund could have received more money in his pay-
check instead. If he could not have, then it becomes more difficult to
justify viewing the employer's contributions as essentially part of the
employee's wages, deferred to a later date.
Even accepting the Daniel court's sale approach, it is submitted that
the court's determined attempt to hold the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Acts applicable to the pension plan in question tainted its
analysis of pension legislation, ERISA in particular, in several respects.
First, the Daniel court failed to evaluate the apparent similarities between
the applicable provisions of the Securities Acts and ERISA, even though
these similarities appear to weaken the court's stance that ERISA was
not designed to be displacing legislation. Both the Securities Acts and
ERISA require filings6' and annual reports62 containing substantially
similar material.6 3 Both impose criminal and civil sanctions for improper
disclosure.64 Furthermore, the court's determination that disclosure under
pension legislation did not satisfy the Securities Acts' requirements of
disclosure in a form understandable to the investor, ignored the language
pension plans as if they represented wages deferred." B. AARON, supra note 21, at 13
(emphasis supplied). Another commentator has noted: "[mlost employees believe
that money paid into the pension fund by their employer is theirs because they earned
it." R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION 12 (1973).
60. The denial of such rights has been summarized by one court as follows:
"Courts have been uniformly reluctant to grant terminated employees vested rights
in a non-contributory pension fund where the terms of the pension contract have not
been literally met." Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338, 342 (D. Minn. 1967).
Even under ERISA's elaborate vesting requirements there is no apparent
correlation between the amount of time worked and employer contributions, and the
amount of money received by the employee who discontinued employment prior to the
vesting of pension rights. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (Supp. V 1975). Instead, the
ERISA formula appears to be an equitable approximation of the employee's benefits in
his pension fund at a given time. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (Supp. V 1975).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1970) ; 29 U.S.C. § 1021(b) (Supp. V 1975).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (Supp. V 1975).
63. For example, each requires names and addresses, descriptions of relevant
provisions, and sources of financing. 15 U.S.C. 78m (1970) ; 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (Supp.
V 1975).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78j (1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1132 (Supp. V 1975). In
addition, a recent regulation promulgated under ERISA elaborates upon the effects
of improper disclosure, possibly in an attempt to avoid fraudulent disclosure practices.
The regulation states in pertinent part: "The style and format of the ERISA notice
shall not have the effect of misleading, misinforming or failing to inform participants
and beneficiaries of a plan .... [I]naccurate or misleading explanatory material will
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of ERISA requiring comparable disclosure.6 5 Moreover, in attacking the
1958 Act as an example of pension legislation requiring the plan participant,
as opposed to the offeror, to initiate disclosure, 66 the court failed to recog-
nize that ERISA, which is similar in approach to the Securities Acts, does
not require the plan participant to initiate disclosure except in limited
circumstances.6 7 All these similarities would tend to rebut the court's
argument that ERISA merely complements the Securities Acts.
Second, the court's analysis did not sufficiently point out the sig-
nificant differences between the Securities Acts and pension legislation
even though these differences lend strong support to the court's holding.
For example, the Securities Acts require disclosure at the time of the
offer,6 8 whereas ERISA requires disclosure only after the employee has
already become a plan participant.6 9 As a result, the prospective bene-
ficiary of a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan does not have the
advantage of ERISA's elaborate disclosure requirements at the time he
must choose his employment and enter into a pension plan. Furthermore,
the court failed to show that, whereas ERISA requires disclosure con-
cerning the way an employee might forfeit his personal rights in the plan 70
and not regarding the quality of the pension plan as an investment, the
Securities Acts require disclosure of all material facts so that a potential
purchaser can make an informed investment decision.71 By omitting to
mention these differences the court did not adequately underscore ERISA's
complementary position with respect to the Securities Acts.
Despite the decision's analytical problems, the Daniel court's narrow
holding that the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts are applicable
to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans has considerable merit. The
enactment by Congress of comprehensive pension legislation did not man-
65. Section 102(a) (1) of ERISA provides: "The summary plan description ...
shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan par-
ticipant. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (Supp. V 1975).
The regulations proposed under ERISA elaborate upon this requirement by
providing that in instances where at least 50 employees or 50% of the plan par-
ticipants are illiterate in English, the summary plan description must be prominently
displayed in the language most comprehensible to them, and must assist them in
coming to an understanding of their rights and obligations under the plan. 40 Fed.
Reg. 246-54 (1975).
66. It should be noted that section 111(a) (1) of ERISA repealed the 1958 Act,
except as to events which occurred before the enactment of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C
§ 1031 (Supp. V 1975).
67. Sections 102 and 104 of ERISA require disclosure to be made to plan
participants by the plan administrator through summary plan descriptions and annual
reports. See id. §§ 1021, 1023 (Supp. V 1975). However, it should be noted that the
participant is required to initiate disclosure, in writing, to acquire information about
the current status of his benefit rights. Id. § 1025.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
69. See notes 62 & 63 supra.
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (Supp. V 1975).
71. See Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulation,
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date the preemption of other laws affecting pension plans.7 2 ERISA, in
particular, did not preempt any state7 8 or federal law affecting securities.
74
Most importantly, the differences between the Securities Acts and the most
recent and comprehensive pension law, ERISA, reveal that standing
alone, ERISA's antifraud provisions contain many gaps which could, at
least potentially, be filled by complementary provisions of the Securities
Acts.75
Although the Daniel decision broached the subject of the propriety
of the SEC's no-sale approach to noncontributory, compulsory pension
plans, the major impact of the decision will undoubtedly be the increased
use of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts by unhappy pension
plan participants. If it is subsequently determined that ERISA was meant
to be displacing legislation, it is submitted that Daniel may nonetheless
encourage an expansion of the scope of ERISA's own antifraud measures.
By extending the coverage of the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Acts to encompass the noncontributory, compulsory pension plan of the
instant case, the Daniel court has created additional safeguards and reme-
dies to further protect the frequently defrauded pension plan participant.76
Although the court's position would have been more effectively articulated
had a more ambitious comparison of pension legislation and the Securities
Acts been undertaken, the Daniel decision nonetheless represents an inno-
vative approach to this unchartered area of the law.
Sara Lou Spielman
72. See SEC v. Garfinkle, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,020 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (complaint in reference to beneficiaries of a union
welfare fund were held to be subject to the Securities Acts, and ERISA was held
not to have exclusive jurisdiction).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1975).
74. Id. § 1144(d).
75. Section 506 of ERISA recognizes the need for the regulatory arm of em-
ployee benefit plans, the Secretary of Labor, to arrange for cooperation and assistance
from other governmental agencies, including the SEC. 29 U.S.C. § 1134 (Supp. V
1975). One district court has suggested that this indicates that ERISA was not
intended to stand alone. SEC v. Garfinkle, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REG. (CCH) ir 95,020 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
76. It has been estimated that as few as eight percent of pension plan participants
in plans with vesting requirements of at least 11 years will ever receive benefits from
their pension fund. See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. at 551,
citing INTERIM REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY,
S. REP. No. 92-634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15, 115-53 (1972).
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SECURITIES LAW - PRoxy REGULATION - A FACT IS MATERIAL
UNDER SEC RULE 14a-9 ONLY IF THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELI-
HOOD THAT A REASONABLE INVESTOR WOULD CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT.
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. (U.S. 1976)
Upon the acquisition of 34% of the outstanding voting securities of TSC
Industries, Inc. (TSC),' National Industries, Inc. (National) succeeded
in placing five of its nominees on TSC's ten-member board of directors.2
The TSC board, with the National nominees abstaining, subsequently
adopted a plan for TSC to liquidate and sell all of its assets to National
in exchange for National securities, which were to be distributed to TSC
shareholders. 3 In order to secure approval of the plan by the shareholders
of each corporation, TSC and National issued a joint proxy statement
recommending approval of the plan and soliciting proxies to that effect.4
Claiming that the omission of certain facts which were relevant to the
degree of National's influence over TSC's management 5 and which had
1. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126, 2129 (1976). National
had acquired this interest by purchasing a block of stock owned by Charles Schmidt,
the principal shareholder, founder, and director of TSC. Id. After the sale of the
Schmidt family holdings, Schmidt and his son resigned from TSC's board of directors.
Id. The plaintiff's complaint 'alleged that Schmidt and certain members of his family
had violated SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), by transferring control
of TSC in such a way as to aid and abet National in acquiring the remainder owner-
ship of TSC for a fraudulently low consideration. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc,,
361 F. Supp. 108, 118 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The district court, finding that the plaintiff was
able to adduce no evidence in support of its allegations, granted the Schmidts' motion
for summary judgment. Id. This disposition was affirmed on appeal. Northway, Inc.
v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
2. 96 S. Ct. at 2129. National's president and chief executive officer became
chairman of the TSC board, and National's executive vice president became chairman
of the TSC executive committee. Id.
3. Id. The plan provided for an exchange ratio whereby a holder of TSC com-
mon stock would exchange each such share for one-half of a share of National series
B preferred stock, and one-and-one-half National warrants. Id. at 2129 n.1. Each
share of TSC preferred stock could be exchanged for six-tenths of a share of National
series B preferred and one National warrant. A National warrant entitled the holder
to purchase one share of National common stock at a fixed.price. National series B
preferred stock was convertible into three-quarters of a share of National common. Id.
4. Id. at 2129. In their answer, the defendants admitted that proxy solicitation
was an essential step in the accomplishment of the proposed sale and liquidation.
Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 361 F. Supp. 108, 112 (N.D. Ill. 1973). For a
discussion of the legal implications of this admission, see note 21 and accompanying
text infra.
5. The proxy statement disclosed the extent of National's stock position in
TSC and revealed that five of the ten TSC board members were also directors of
National. 96 S. Ct. at 2134. However, the statement failed to reveal that National's
chief executive officer was also the chairman of TSC's board of directors and that
National's executive vice president became the chairman of TSC's executive com-
mittee. Id. The proxy statement also failed to disclose that in prior reports filed with
the SEC, both TSC and National had stated that there existed a possibility that
National might be deemed to "control" TSC under SEC Rule 12b, 17 C.F.R. §§
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a bearing upon the favorability of the proposed exchange to TSC share-
holders6 rendered the joint proxy statement materially misleading, North-
way, Inc., one of TSC's shareholders, filed a complaint 7 in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that
National and TSC had thereby violated section 14(a) of the Securities
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 8 and SEC Rule 14a-9 9 promulgated there-
6. The joint proxy statement revealed that an investment banking firm had
rendered a favorable opinion on the fairness to TSC shareholders of the exchange of
TSC stock for National securities. 96 S. Ct. at 2135. The proxy statement represented
that this opinion was based in part upon "the substantial premium over current market
values represented by the securities being offered to TSC shareholders . . . ." Id. at
2135-36. By reference to a table of current market values which appeared four pages
later in the proxy statement, a TSC shareholder could compute the apparent increase
in the market value of his shareholdings which would result from the contemplated
exchange of securities. Id. at 2136. Such a computation indicated that the proposed
exchange would yield a market value premium of 27% to holders of TSC preferred
stock and a premium of 22% to the TSC common stockholders. Id. However, the
proxy statement failed to reveal that the investment banking firm's opinion was based
not strictly upon the figures presented in the proxy statement, but rather upon the
conclusion that as a result of the issuance of additional warrants in the transaction,
the value of the stock would be diluted and decline substantially from the current
market price of $5.25, which was set out in the proxy statement, to a predicted value
of $3.50. Id. When calculated using the latter value, the actual market premium to be
received by TSC shareholders in the transaction was far less than that which was
apparent on the basis of the information presented in the proxy statement. Id.
Moreover, the proxy statement failed to reveal that National and a mutual
fund, Madison Fund, Inc., had made purchases of National securities accounting for
8.5% of all recorded transactions in National common stock during the interim between
National's acquisition of the Schmidt interests and the issuance of the joint proxy
statement. Id. at 2138-39. The plaintiff contended that nondisclosure of these facts,
together with a failure to reveal that National's board chairman was also a director
of Madison and that Madison's president and chief executive was a salaried consultant
to National, prevented it from discovering an alleged manipulation by National and
Madison of the prices of National stock for the purpose of decreasing the value of
the proposed exchange to TSC shareholders. Id.
7. The complaint was filed the day before the shareholder meeting which was
called to consider the proposed liquidation and sale of assets. Id. at 2130. While
requesting injunctive relief, plaintiff failed to move for a temporary restraining order.
Id. Upon the implementation of the plan, plaintiff amended its complaint to seek
monetary damages, restitution, and other equitable relief. Id. at 2130.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). Section 14(a) provides in pertinent part: "It
shall be unlawful for any person . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors, to solicit or permit the use of his name to solicit any
proxy. .. ." Id.
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was enacted by Congress in the belief
that "[f]air corporate sufferage is an important right that should attach to every equity
security bought on a public exchange." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1934). Its basic purpose was to provide stockholders with sufficient information to
ensure their informed choice when consulted for approval of corporate transactions.
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976). The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) promulgated rule 14a-9 pursuant to the broad mandate of section 14(a). For
the text of section 14(a), see note 8 supra. Rule 14a-9 provides in pertinent part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written
or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the cir-
[VOL. 22
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under.10 The district court, holding that the evidence presented a genuine
issue of fact" as to whether the facts omitted from the joint proxy state-
cumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements therein not false or misleading ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976). In addition, the SEC enacted other rules mandating
specific disclosures in proxy statements which were required to be filed with the Con-
mission and distributed to shareholders. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3 to 14a-8, 14a-11,
14a-101 (1976).
10. 96 S. Ct. at 2129. The plaintiff also brought a claim under SEC Rule 14a-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1976). 96 S. Ct. at 2129. The substance of that claim was that
National had obtained control of TSC, as defined by the SEC rules, and had failed to
disclose this fact in the joint proxy statement. 96 S. Ct. at 2129; see SEC Rule
12b-2(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.2(f) (1976). Rule 14a-3 prohibits the solicitation of
proxies unless each person solicited is furnished with a proxy statement containing
the information specified in schedule 14A. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1976). Item 5(e)
of schedule 14A requires that a change in control of the corporation be disclosed. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 5(e) (1976). Hence, if National "controlled" TSC, its
failure to disclose this fact would violate the proxy rules per se. The district court
denied summary judgment on the basis that the evidence concerning whether National
actually controlled TSC was conflicting. 361 F. Supp. at 111. This ruling was upheld
on appeal. 512 F.2d at 329. The Supreme Court did not reach this issue.
Most shareholder attacks upon corporate reorganizations are confined to
actions brought under rule 14a and allege deception in the proxy materials by which
approval of the proposed transaction is obtained. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW
§ 6.5 (1975). However, the substantive protection against unfairness in corporate
reorganizations afforded to the investing public by the federal securities laws is not
limited to the proxy rules.
An alternative mode of regulating deceptive proxy solicitations is through
the use of SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), which makes it unlawful to
use any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative device, act, or practice in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. Id. It has been held, for purposes of the rule,
that securities issued or surrendered in a merger or other reorganization are "pur-
chased and sold" by the shareholders of the acquired corporation and that a shareholder
aggrieved by fraudulent practices occurring "in connection with" such reorganization
may be awarded relief under the provisions of that rule. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,
380 F.2d 262, 266-67 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) ; H.L. Green Co.
v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; cf. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). Although the impact of this
judicial concept will be minimal where the proxy rules are capable of providing ade-
quate protection to minority shareholders, the potential applicability of rule 10b-5 to
corporate reorganizations will be extremely important where the proxy rules do not
apply. A. BROMBERG, supra at 133-38 nn.92 & 93.
Another dramatic development in the area of federal regulation of corporate
reorganizations is the SEC's promulgation of rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1976).
Effective January 1, 1973, rule 145 rescinded rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1976). See
37 Fed. Reg. 23636 (1972). Rule 145 essentially provides that where a reorganiza-
tion plan includes a proposal for an exchange of securities (e.g., a statutory merger,
stock for assets with a distribution to shareholders) and the applicable state law
requires it to be submitted to a vote of a corporation's shareholders, the Provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) (Securities Act), are appli-
cable to the transaction. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1976). Under the rule, a reor-
ganization proposal is deemed to be an offering of securities within section 2 of the
Securities Act. Id. Section 5 of the Securities Act would therefore apply to require
that the reorganization proposal be registered with the SEC and that written offers
(e.g., the proxy statement itself) be made by a prospectus that meets the requirements
of section 10 of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j (1970). Failure to comply
with these requirements would result in liability under section 12(1) of the Act, and
any false or misleading statements made in the registration statement, prospectus,
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ment were material, 12 denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on
the issue of liability. On appeal,"1 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and ruled that the TSC-National proxy
statement was materially misleading as a matter of law.' 4 However, the
United States Supreme Court, finding that the court of appeals had applied
an improper standard of materiality, reversed, holding that an omitted or
misstated fact is material within the purview of the federal proxy rules
only "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote." 15 TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976).
The problem of defining "materiality" for the purpose of federal
securities regulation 6 was first treated by the Supreme Court in Mills v.
or proxy statement would result in liability under section 11 or section 12(2) of the
Securities Act, which provides procedural advantages to the plaintiff as compared to
actions brought under section 14a of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771
(1970).
11. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that there be no
genuine issue as to any material fact before a summary judgment may be entered.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
12. 361 F. Supp. at 114, 116. It is not clear what standard of materiality the
court applied in reaching this conclusion. At one point the court observed: "To
establish a violation [of rule 14a-9, the] plaintiff must prove . .. that the misstate-
ment or omissions were material in the sense that they 'might have been considered
important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to
vote.'" Id. at 111, 112, quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384
(1970). In denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, however, it is
evident that the court relied upon a more stringent test of materiality:
While the court believes that [the omissions] might have been considered im-
portant by TSC shareholders, it cannot conclude that these facts were so obviously
important that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue; that is, as to
whether they would have a significant propensity to affect the voting process.
Id. at 114.
13. The appeal was interlocutory in nature and was taken by leave of the court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). 96 S. Ct. at 2130.
14. 512 F.2d at 333, 335-36. The legal standard of materiality employed by the
court was that an omitted fact is material if a "reasonable stockholder might con-
sider [it] important." Id. at 330.
15. 96 S. Ct. at 2133. When the Court applied this standard to the uncontested
facts of the case, it found that the established omissions were not "'so obviously
important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of
materiality'," and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. Id. at 2133,
2140, quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
16. The concept of materiality is central to federal regulation of securities. Vari-
ous sections of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the regulations promul-
gated under each prohibit the misstatement or omission of material facts within the
context which each section purports to regulate. See, e.g., Securities Act, § 11, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1970) (prohibiting omissions and misstatements of material facts in
registration statement filed pursuant to Securities Act) ; Securities Act, § 12, 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1970) (civil liability in connection with offers and sales of securities
accomplished by materially misleading statements) ; Exchange Act, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (b) (1970) and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) (making it un-
lawful to misstate or to omit a material fact in connection with purchase or sale of
securities); Exchange Act, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970) (prohibiting ma-
terially misleading statements in connection with tender offer). Hence, a definition of
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Electric Auto-Lite Co.,' 7 where the Court attempted to explicate the ele-
ments of a section 14(a) private damage action.18 The crucial issue in
Mills was whether the grantor of a proxy is required to prove, as a sub-
stantive condition precedent to recovery under section 14(a), that an
omission of fact from a proxy solicitation actually had a decisive effect
upon shareholder voting. 19 A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the im-
position of this requirement of causation in fact as being contrary to the
remedial purposes of the statute20 and held that a causal relationship be-
tween the proxy violation and the plaintiff's alleged injury sufficient to
warrant private relief is established by proof that: 1) the misstatement or
omission was material, and 2) that the proxy solicitation itself was "an
essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction."' 21 Although the Mil!s
materiality is tantamount to a designation of the scope of disclosure which is required
in order to comply with the mandate of the securities laws.
17. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
18. Id. at 381-86. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), a unanimous
Supreme Court found that a private cause of action was available under section 27 of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), to those shareholders who had been in-
jured as the result of a violation of the SEC's proxy rules. 377 U.S. at 430-31. How-
ever, the Court did not pass on the substantive elements of such a cause of action.
19. In Mills, the shareholders claimed that a merger had been approved by them
on the basis of materially false and misleading statements in proxy materials and
asserted a claim for damages based upon rule 14a-9. 396 U.S. at 378. The Seventh
Circuit, holding that causation was a necessary element of a private action for damages
under section 14(a), reversed the district court's adjudicaiton of relief. Id. at 380.
Noting that a requirement of proof of reliance by thousands of shareholders would be
a very difficult burden to impose upon a plaintiff-shareholder, the court of appeals held
that if the transaction was unfair, causation would be presumed. Id. Even though
the court of appeals agreed with the district court's determination that defendants had
in fact violated rule 14a-9, the court held that since the transaction was fair, the
plaintiffs had not established a causal relationship between approval of the proposed
merger by a requisite number of shareholders and the violation of rule 14a-9. Id.
20. The Court noted that reliance, especially reliance upon a nondisclosure, by
thousands of shareholders would be extremely difficult to demonstrate. Id. at 382 n.5.
Imposition of a requirement of such difficult proofs would make enforcement of section
14(a) by a private damage action exceedingly burdensome, even where a violation of
the statute is clear, and would thus thwart the purpose of the Exchange Act by effec-
tively denying a remedy for its violation. Id. at 382 n.5, 385.
Moreover, where a material nondisclosure is proved, the Seventh Circuit's
presumption that the shareholders have relied upon misleading statements (see note
19 supra) would allow a court to exercise its judgment as to the advisability of a
transaction. 396 U.S. at 381-82. This result is wholly inconsistent with the Exchange
Act's policy of allowing such judgments to be made by the shareholders. Id. at 382.
Thus, it was thought that the presumption adopted by the Seventh Circuit would be
inimical to the rights which section 14(a) affords to shareholders. Id. at 381-82,
384-85.
21. 396 U.S. at 385. This two-pronged test was responsive to the traditional re-
quirements of causation in a common law action sounding in deceit. Had the Mills
Court treated a private damage action under rule 14a-9 as an action at common law to
recover damages for fraud, two elements would have to be shown in order to demon-
strate a causal link between a violation of rule 14a-9 and the alleged injury to the
shareholders. The first of these elements would be reliance upon the misrepresentation
or nondisclosure by the individual shareholders. Id. at 380. The Mills Court acknowl-
edged that reliance was an element of a common law action in deceit, but seemed to
interpret the concept of reliance to require that the injured party would not have
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Court expressly declined to pass on the materiality of the omission from the
Auto-Lite proxy statement,2 2 it indicated that the scope of disclosure re-
quired by the concept of materiality encompasses all information which
"'might [be] considered important by a reasonable shareholder." 23 The
Court referred to this as a "requirement that the [nondisclosed information]
have a significant propensity to affect the voting process."
24
taken the action which damaged him "but for" the defrauding party's misrepresenta-
tion. Id. at 380 (semble). It should be noted, however, that this is not the common
law test of reliance. The common law required only that the misrepresentation exert
a "material influence" upon the defrauded party or play a "substantial part" in his
decision. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 715 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938). When, as evidenced by the first prong, the Mills Court
allowed materiality to stand alone as sufficient proof of causation, it in effect created
a presumption that the shareholders had "relied" in the common law sense of that
term. For a discussion of the legal effect of such a presumption, see Note, Causation and
Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 135-38 (1970-71).
The second common law element of causation would require that a sufficient
number of shareholders have relied so as to have potentially affected the consummation
of the transaction. 396 U.S. at 385. The Court's "essential link" prong creates a pre-
sumption of this fact as well. For a discussion of this issue, see Note, supra at 107-34;
21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 787 (1969-70).
22. 396 U.S. at 381 n.4.
23. Id. at 384 (dictum) (emphasis added). Among the cases cited by the Mills
Court as lending some support to its use of this particular language were List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), and
General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 493 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969). In List, the Second Circuit held that both materiality and
reliance were necessary prerequisites to recovery under rule lOb-5. The court's defini-
tion of materiality, however, was somewhat ambiguous. At one point the List court
indicated that a fact is material if a reasonable investor would attach importance to it.
340 F.2d at 462. Shortly thereafter, the court held that a fact is material if its dis-
closure might affect the value of a corporation's stock. Id., citing Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
In General Time, however, a case involving section 14(a), the same court
held that a fact is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a misstatement or
omission may have led a stockholder to grant a proxy to the solicitor or withhold
one ... whereas in the absence of this he would have taken a contrary course." 403
F.2d at 162.
The Mills Court also cited the Second Restatement of Torts, which states
that a fact is material if "[i]t is one whose existence or non-existence a reasonable
man would attach importance to in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question .... ." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (a) (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1964).
Because of the various standards adopted by the cited authorities, it is highly
questionable whether the "might" language employed by the Mills Court represented
an accurate articulation of its thinking.
24. 396 U.S. at 384 (dictum) (emphasis supplied by the Court). The Court
noted that this materiality requirement was found in the express terms of rule 14a-9
and held that the requirement
adequately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be estab-
lished by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for which
approval is sought, that correction of the defect or imposition of liability would
not further the interests protected by § 14(a).
Id.
In a subsequent rule lob-5 case, the Supreme Court held that proof of reli-
ance with regard to a nondisclosure was not necessary where the defendant had
violated a positive duty of disclosure to the plaintiff, provided the undisclosed fact
:[VOL. 22
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Prior to the Mills decision, essentially two judicial standards of ma-
teriality were applied in securities fraud cases. One such test held that a
fact was material if it would have been considered to be important by a
reasonable investor. 25 The other viewpoint, formulated in General Time
Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc.,26 sought to mleasure materiality by inquir-
ing as to whether there existed a substantial likelihood that disclosure of
a fact would cause an investor to pursue a course of action contrary to that
which he would have chosen absent disclosure. 27 The Mills dicta fostered
the development of a third judicial definition of materiality which viewed
as material a fact which might be important to a reasonable investor.28 How-
ever, Mills did not abrogate the application of the other two tests, 29 and
all three formulations of materiality continued to be applied by the courts
with relative indifference to the crucial distinctions between them30 until
was material. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
The Court stated that nondisclosed facts were material "in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of [his] decision." Id.
(emphasis added). However, the Court did not repeat the "significant propensity"
language found in Mills.
25. See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356 (10th Cir. 1970) (Securities Act,
section 12(2)); SEC v. Texas Gulph Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Exchange Act, rule lOb-5); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp.,
361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966) (Exchange Act, rule 10b-5) ; List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (Exchange
Act, rule 10b-5) ; Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (Exchange
Act, rule 10b-5); Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (D. Md., 1967), aff'd,
390 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1968) (Exchange Act, rule 14a-9); Evans v. Armour & Co.,
241 F. Supp. 705, 709 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (Exchange Act rule 14a-9).
This test of materiality is identical to that employed at common law. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). In addition, it is
the test adopted in the ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 256(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
26. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
27. Id. at 162; cf. Abramson v. Nytonics, 312 F. Supp. 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(Exchange Act, section 14(a)); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (Exchange Act, section 14(a)).
28. For cases applying this Standard, see note 30 infra.
29. Since the Mills "might standard" of materiality was mere dicta (see notes
22-24 and accompanying text supra), subsequent courts were not bound by it. More-
over, the "significant propensity" language employed by the Court in connection with
its citation to authority supporting the "would" and General Time standards of
materiality lent clear support to the proposition that these were still viable standards
of materiality. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
30. For examples of cases employing varying standards of materiality, see Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973) (fact material under section 14(e) if it would be important to
reasonable investor); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(fact material under section 14(e) and rule lob-5 if it would be important) ; Sonesta
Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1973) (fact
material under section 14(e) if it might be important) ; Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1973)
(fact material under rule lob-5 if it might be important) ; Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp.,
386 F. Supp. 44, 66 (D.N.J. 1974) (fact material under rule 14a-9 if it might well
be considered important); Ross v. Longchamps, 336 F. Supp. 434, 441 (E.D. Mo.
1971) (fact material under rule 14 a-9 if it might be considered important) ; Beatty v.
Bright, 318 F. Supp. 169, 173 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (fact material under section 14(a)
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the Second Circuit's consideration of the issue in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc.Y'
In Gerstle, which involved an alleged violation of rule 14a-9,3 2 the
court held that the "would" test was the only correct standard for defining
"materiality." 33  In so doing, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the
"might" standard as being "unrealistic" in that it set too low a threshold
for the imposition of a duty of disclosure.3 4 However, the Second Circuit's
unambiguous definition of materiality was not followed by the Seventh
Circuit in the instant case. The court of appeals in TSC Industries spe-
cifically rejected the "would" test in holding that any test of materiality
which does not require inclusion of facts in a proxy statement which might
influence a reasonable shareholder would seriously undermine the prophy-
Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (fact material under section
14(a) if it might be important) ; In re Brown Co., 355 F. Supp. 574, 587 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (General Time standard used in section 14(a) case).
31. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
32. In Gerstle it was claimed that the defendants had employed misleading proxy
statements to solicit proxies authorizing approval of a merger. The nature of the
alleged deception was that the acquiring corporation had misrepresented its business
plans concerning the disposition of the assets of the acquired corporation. Id. at 1284-89.
33. Id. at 1302. In addition to the court's adoption of the "would" standard, it
seemingly approved the application of the General Time standard. See id. However,
when the court examined the facts of the case to determine whether the misstatements
were material, it applied the "would" standard exclusively. See id. at 1302-03.
Before the court even reached the materiality issue, it held that negligence
was sufficient to impose liability under rule 14a-9. Id. at 1298-1301. The court reasoned
that a proxy statement served much the same function as a registration statement
under the Securities Act. Id. at 1300. Following this analogy, the court observed that
the imposition of a broad standard of culpability for violation of the proxy rules
would serve the salutory purpose of reiterating the high degree of care owed by man-
agement to its shareholders in the preparation of proxy solicitations. Id. Moreover,
the court found that the imposition of liability based upon negligence would be con-
sistent with the purpose and language of section 14(a) itself and with the structure
of the securities laws as a whole. Id. at 1299; accord, Richland v. Crandall, 262 F.
Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.,
458 F.2d 255, 289 (3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting). But cf.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1377 (1976) (scienter required to impose
civil liability under rule lOb-5).
For a discussion of the view that the definition of materiality should be tied
to the level of culpability required for finding a violation of a securities regulation as
a means of limiting liability, see Kirkland, Misleading Proxy Statements, 31 Bus.
LAW. 1449 (1976).
34. 478 F.2d at 1302. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, suggested that the
difference between the "would" and "might" standards may be "gossamer." However,
he went on to note that the latter standard was "too suggestive of a mere possibility"
to be employed in levying the very heavy damages which may be involved in a rule
14a-9 action. Id. This would be especially true where the issue is being tried to a
jury. Id. at 1302 n.22.
One year after the Gerstle decision, the Fifth Circuit, in sustaining the
propriety of a jury instruction which had mandated application of the common law
"would" standard, eschewed application of a "might" standard of materiality as too
speculative to serve as a reliable guide in fixing liability under section 14(a). Small-
wood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974).
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lactic effect of section 14(a)'s disclosure requirements and render nugatory
the purpose of Mills in dispensing with positive proof of reliance.8 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the instant case in order
to resolve this apparent conflict between the circuit courts of appeals.8 6
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Marshall rejected the Seventh
Circuit's reading of Mills in favor of the Gerstle line of analysis which
views the "significant propensity" language of Mills and not its "might
affect" dictum as suggesting the appropriate definition of materiality.3
Moreover, even the "significant propensity" language was not considered
to be controlling in the instant case. Since the Mills Court had specifically
declined to rule on the question of whether the omitted facts there were
material, the "significant propensity" language was presented only by way
of dicta to give "some sense of the notion" of materiality prior to the
Court's consideration of the causation issue. 8  Thus, the TSC Industries
Court felt unconstrained by Mills' articulation of materiality and held that
a definition of the term "material" could be considered de novo.8 9
Having rejected Mills as controlling precedent, the Court defined its
task in formulating a standard of materiality under rule 14a-9 as determin-
ing "how certain it must be that the [omitted or misrepresented] fact would
affect a reasonable investor's judgment." 40 In making this determination,
the Court initially reaffirmed its prior construction of section 14(a) as
remedial legislation designed by Congress to ensure disclosure by manage-
ment in order to afford shareholders an adequate opportunity to make an
informed choice when consulted for approval of a corporate transaction.4 '
35. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330-32 (7th Cir. 1975).
The Seventh Circuit viewed the difference between "would" and "might" as a distinc-
tion between an objective test of probable reliance and a test which assessed the
materiality of a fact in terms of its relevance to the proposed transaction. Id. at 331
n.13. The court then observed that the application of a probable reliance ("would")
standard would undercut the spirit of Mills:
It would make little sense to hold that causation is established by a more lenient
standard than materiality. In fact any test of materiality which requires a finding
of some probability that the omitted fact would affect the voting process necessi-
tates the same difficult proofs the Supreme Court sought to avoid by eliminating
the need for independent proof of causation or reliance.
Id. at 331. Having eliminated probable reliance as a mode of defining materiality, the
court's "might" test of materiality was phrased in terms of relevance: "We believe
that relevancy alone is the critical test of materiality and that when relevant facts are
withheld from a proxy solicitation, materiality is established independent of any proofs
of probable reliance or causation." Id. at n.13.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 2130.
37. Id. at 2132; accord, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 604 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973) (significant propensity language "closer to the right flavor"
of proper test).
38. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. at 2132.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2131.
41. 96 S. Ct. at 2132. The Court then elaborated upon the relationship between
this congressional policy and a section 14(a) private damage action. Apparently re-
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The Court stressed, however, that this policy does not compel unlimited
dissemination of information to security holders; rather, the intendment of
the proxy regulations themselves imposes an inherent limitation upon the
scope of the disclosure.4 2 Specifically, the Court warned that overdisclosure
of information in proxy statements may create a serious impediment to
informed decisionmaking by causing the shareholder to become inundated
with information of arguable significance.4 3 The Court perceived that, in
view of the fact that enormous liability may attach for violations of rule
14a-9, a standard of materiality which was too low would encourage man-
agement to engage in gross overdisclosure with its attendant confusion and
resulting incursion into the shareholders' right of informed corporate suf-
ferage.4 4 Reasoning that the Seventh Circuit's "might" standard of ma-
teriality was so low that it presented these dangers, the Supreme Court
rejected the "might" formulation, holding that the interest in protecting
investors would best be served by a standard of materiality that requires
disclosure of a fact only "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reason-
able shareholder would consider it important to deciding how to vote. ' 45
Justice Marshall, however, hastened to point out that this standard
does not require a showing that the disclosure of a fact would have "caused"
a shareholder to change his vote; rather, the Court's test of materiality
was held to require only a showing that "the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available. '46 Applying its newly
subsequent to the implementation of a transaction approved on the basis of misleading
proxy statements, the most "desirable role" for the Court would be to determine
"whether in fact the proposal would have been favored by the shareholders and con-
summated in the absence of any misstatement or omission," but that since such a
determination cannot be made with any degree of certainty, the prophylactic purposes
of the rule are better served by resolving doubts as to the significance of the omitted
information in favor of the shareholders. Id.
42. Id. at 2132-33.
43. Id.
44. Id. The suggestion of the Court that overdisclosure of facts may impede in-
formed decisionmaking by shareholders finds implicit support in the judicial doctrine
of "buried facts." This doctrine holds that when important facts are buried within
a sea of less important information, the proxy statement is materially misleading in
that it deprives shareholders of full and honest disclosure. Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 433-34 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 375
(1970) ; Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 995 (D. Del. 1971);
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
modified on other grounds, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972).
45. 96 S. Ct. at 2133.
46. Id. The TSC Industries Court's caveat appears to be merely an elaboration
upon an observation which was made in Mills. In Mills, the Supreme Court had em-
phasized that section 14(a) guarantees to shareholders the right to all material infor-
mation relevant to their decision. 396 U.S. at 384. Failure to supply this information
is itself an actionable wrong. Hence, the nature of the information which was not
disclosed need not have been such as would have affected the shareholder's decision
in the sense that its disclosure would have caused him to change his vote; rather, the
purpose of the section is thwarted, and liability may be imposed, where that informa-
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created test to the facts in the instant case, the Court concluded that the
grant of a summary judgment was inappropriate, since the omissions were
not " 'so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot
differ on the question of materiality.' -47
The critical problem faced by the TSC Industries Court was how to
formulate an acceptable standard of materiality in a way which would not
emasculate the thrust of its holding in Mills. 48 The ratio decidendi of Mills
was that a determination of the actual effect of a misstatement on the
behavior of shareholders, particularly with reference to an undisclosed fact,
could not be made with any degree of certainty.49 In view of this difficulty, a
requirement that the plaintiff prove actual causation5" would completely
tion would have been important to the shareholders "regardless of whether the [facts]
were such that a reasonable stockholder would have approved the transaction after
more careful analysis." 396 U.S. at 384 n.6.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 2133, 2140, quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d
1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970).
The Court held that, in view of the fact that the joint proxy statement had
disclosed facts which indicated the potential influence of !National on TSC, the proxy
statement's failure to state that National "might" be deemed to be in control of TSC
or that the president and executive vice president of National were, respectively, the
chairman of TSC's board and the chairman of its executive committee was not
materially misleading as a matter of law. 96 S. Ct. at 2134-35; see note 5 supra.
With respect to the question of whether the proxy statement was materially
misleading as to the premium which TSC shareholders could expect from the trans-
action, the Court held that it, too, was a question involving issues which were "best
left to the trier of fact." 96 S. Ct. at 2138; see note 6 supra. Moreover, the Court
would not allow summary judgment on the issue concerning the failure to disclose
the purchases of National common stock by National and Madison Fund, since the
materiality of those purchases hinged on whether they were coordinated, which was
in turn a question of fact. 96 S. Ct. at 2138-40; see note 6 supra.
While it may be difficult to obtain summary judgment where materiality is
in issue, the Court made it clear that there might be some cases - for example, where
the undisclosed facts were "obviously suggestive of control" - in which the omission
would be deemed to be material as a matter of law, thus making such a disposition
appropriate. 96 S. Ct. at 2135 n.15. Moreover, the Court reemphasized the power of
the SEC to promulgate rules requiring disclosure of specified information. Id. at 2140.
Failure to make such required disclosure would per se result in liability for violation
of section 14(a) regardless of the "materiality" or "nonmateriality" of the fact
omitted. Id. For an example of the specific disclosures which the SEC requires in
proxy statements, see SEC Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1976).
48. This problem is quite different from that of whether the Mills "might be
important" dictum was, of its own force, controlling on the issue of materiality. The
Court quite properly concluded that this language had no such effect. See 96 S. Ct.
at 2132. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Mills "definition" of ma-
teriality was dictum, and that it did not represent a clear articulation of the Court's
perception of materiality at that time, but was employed merely to provide a "sense"
of the notion. See notes 29 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
49. See 96 S. Ct. at 2132.
50. The Court's holding with respect to causation had a dual aspect. The share-
holder did not have to prove that "but for" the nondisclosure, he would have voted
differently. Moreover, he did not have to prove actual reliance in the classic sense
that the misrepresented fact actually formed a substantial, but not ncessarily con-
trolling, part in his decision. Proof of materiality would create a presumption of such
reliance and allow the shareholder to recover. For a discussion of this aspect of
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thwart the remedial purpose of the securities laws either by precluding the
availability of relief entirely or by allowing the retrospective judgment of
the factfinder as to the merits of the proposed transaction to be substituted
for the informed prospective judgment of the shareholders themselves.5
Analysis of the range of choices available to a court in formulating a
standard of materiality demonstrates how the essence of Mills can be
subtly undercut by the adoption of one standard over another. At one end
of the materiality continuum, a number of courts have defined materiality
as nothing less than a requirement that the nature of a fact be such that its
disclosure would have caused a reasonable shareholder to take a contrary
course of action.52 Such a standard completely destroys the vitality of the
Mills decision. The test would require proof that a misstatement or omis-
sion was of such a nature that it would have a decisive effect upon the
voting and would allow the substitution of the factfinder's judgment as to
the advisability of a proposed corporate action for that of the shareholders
- results which Mills determined were noxious to the remedial purpose
of section 14(a). 53 Hence, the instant Court's implicit rejection of the
objective causation-in-fact test of materiality 4 is consistent both with its
prior rulings and with the purpose of the proxy rules.
At the other end of the materiality spectrum, the "might be considered
important" standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit55 represents a deter-
mination that any fact which is logically relevant to a shareholder's decision
on a proposed transaction is material.56 Such a test comes into minimum
conflict with the policy embodied by Mills, for it is entirely objective and
requires no prediction as to the probable effect of disclosure upon a share-
holder, reasonable or otherwise. However, as adequately pointed out in
51. Worthy of reiteration at this point is the fact that Mills expressed particular
concern for allowing the shareholders to make their own decisions based upon all
material facts. See 396 U.S. at 381. When shareholders have been denied this right,
the policy of section 14(a) demands that an effective remedy be available. The Court
held that such redress should not be denied them on the basis of a judge's decision as
to the wisdom of the transaction. 396 U.S. at 381; see note 21 and accompanying
text supra.
52. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
53. The sheer impropriety of this standard as a test for materiality was made
manifest in Mills. There the Court noted that a nondisclosure which effectively
thwarted "the informed decision at which the statute aims" is actionable "regardless
of whether the [facts] were such that a reasonable stockholder would have approved
the transaction after more careful analysis." 396 U.S. at 384 n.6.
54. The Court's rejection of this test was clearest when it pointed out that its
new standard "does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote." 96 S. Ct.
at 2133.
55. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
56. Id. Conceivably, the "might be important" test could represent something
more than the relevance of a fact to a proposed transaction. However, when the word
"might" is perceived by the person applying the test as suggesting a degree of prob-
ability higher than logical relevance, the reality to that person of the distinction
between "might" and "would" becomes questionable. Hence, for the sake of clarity,
this discussion will assume, as did the Seventh Circuit, that a test couched in terms of
"might" is tantamount to a standard based upon relevance. Id.
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Justice Marshall's opinion, such a low threshold of materiality has the fatal
disadvantage of requiring the dissemination of so much information that it
would destroy the utility of the federal proxy rules.5
7
A more acceptable middle ground in reconciling the conflict between
the policy of Mills and the equally weighty policy of providing management
with some sense of certainty in communicating information to its share-
holders is represented by the Gerstle "would" standard.58 This standard
comports with Mills by focusing attention upon the qualitative significance
of the information itself rather than by requiring the factfinder to usurp
the judgment of the shareholders by assessing the impact of a factual dis-
closure upon behavior. Yet it, too, has a tendency to weaken the under-
pinnings of Mills. Mills declared that the assessment of the operative sig-
nificance of information was within the province of the shareholders in the
first instance. 59 The "would" test, which requires the factfinder to determine
with certainty the actual significance of a given fact, invades this province
to some extent.60 However, in order to avoid this incursion entirely, the
Court would be relegated to employing a test of materiality based solely
upon relevance with its attendant problems of overdisclosure. 61
While Justice Marshall's opinion in TSC Industries suggested that,
of the three judicial approaches to materiality, the Gerstle outlook is in
greatest harmony with the policy against overdisclosure, 62 he impliedly
recognized the tendency of a "would" standard to detract from the practical
results which Mills intended ;63 his attempt to reconcile these competing
considerations is a tour de force of judicial finesse. It should be noted
that the standard adopted by Marshall requires only that there be a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider a fact
significant.6 4 By not requiring complete certainty as to whether a reason-
able shareholder would consider a particular fact important, the opinion
57. For a discussion of the fact that overdisclosure of information is more
detrimental than helpful to shareholders and can itself result in liability for violation
of rule 14a-9, see note 44 and accompanying text supra.
58. For a discussion of Gerstle, see notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
59. 396 U.S. at 381.
60. The implication of the "would" test is that a plaintiff will be denied recovery
even if he proves that it is likely, but not beyond doubt, that a nondisclosed fact
would influence a reasonable investor. Such a result is inconsistent with the declared
policy under section 14(a) of "resolving doubts in favor of those the statute [was]
designed to protect." Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
61. For a discussion of the problems which the "might" test has engendered with
respect to overdisclosure, see notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
62. 96 S. Ct. at 2133.
63. This implicit recognition is found in the fact that the Court did not adopt the
longstanding "would" standard verbatim, but rather modified it. See note 45 and
accompanying text supra.
64. 96 S. Ct. at 2133. It is interesting to note that one year prior to the Supreme
Court's adoption of this standard, a federal district court had employed identical lan-
guage in defining materiality for the purposes of an action brought under rule 14a-9.
See Mayer v. Development Corp., 396 F. Supp. 917, 927 (D. Del. 1975). The TSC
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allows the shareholders' interest in relevant information some leeway where
doubt exists as to the importance of a fact.65 Thus, by combining the "sub-
stantial likelihood" language with the traditional "would be important"
language, Marshall's formulation requires that the shareholders be pro-
vided with as great an amount of information as is consistent with the
policy against overdisclosure.
The Court's consideration of a proper definition of materiality was con-
fined solely to assessing "how certain it must be that [a] fact would affect
a reasonable investor's judgment."6 6 Looking beyond the Supreme Court's
resolution of this narrow issue, it must be asked whether a "reasonable
person" approach to materiality is adequate to serve the Court's professed
purpose of defining materiality in such a way as to afford corporate manage-
ment some degree of certainty regarding what information can be withheld
from investors without incurring liability.6 7 Since there is no empirical
method of singling out a "reasonable investor" and predicting how he
would have acted,6 8 the factfinder necessarily possesses wide discretion in
making a determination of materiality where the issue is formulated solely
in terms of a "reasonable person" standard. 69 Under such a standard,
management must likewise determine the materiality of a particular fact
on the basis of its visceral reactions as to its importance and can only hope
that its viewpoint will correspond to the equally discretionary reaction of the
judge or jury.70 Such a result is hardly consistent with the Supreme Court's
theoretical conception of materiality as providing a sufficiently ascertainable
standard of disclosure. Thus, viewed by itself, the TSC Industries reason-
65. See note 60 supra.
66. 96 S. Ct. at 2131 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 2132-33. At common law, the professed purpose of the materiality
requirement in deceit actions was that of "promoting stability in commercial trans-
actions." W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 719. Still, it can earnestly be questioned
whether the common law "reasonable person" standard effectuated this purpose. In view
of the fact that actions in deceit could be brought with respect to a wide variety of
business transactions, the common law test of materiality is probably the best that
could be formulated in order to accommodate the factual differences existing among
the range of situations to which the tort applies. In the area of federal securities
regulation, however, where the factual deviations are not as broad, it is possible to
delineate a standard more narrowly tailored to the articulated purpose of stability.
For a discussion of such standards, see note 71 infra.
68. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW §
9.21(2) (a) (1975).
69. The breadth of this discretion is indicated by the TSC Industries Court's
analogy between a determination of negligence by a jury and a determination of
materiality. 96 S. Ct. 2133 n.12.
70. See Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts," 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1061, 1068-76 (1971). Professor Kripke notes the "earnest attempt" of the Second
Circuit to formulate a workable standard of materiality in terms of the "reasonable
man," but rejects such a standard as incapable of consistent application. Id. at 1068-69.
He then suggests that in certain contexts the question of whether a fact is material
is "unimportant" because such a determination cannot be made with "any degree of
certainty." Id. at 1075. Therefore, he proposes that the standard for imposition of
liability should be "whether, after reasonable investigation under the circumstances,
the persons accused of misrepresentation reasonably believed that the presentation
which they made was a fair one." Id. (emphasis in the original).
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able investor standard is not likely to be a helpful tool in assessing the na-
ture of management's responsibility in the preparation of proxy materials.
7 1
However, the TSC Industries decision is not wholly illusory in pro-
viding guidance as to the materiality determination. When the decision is
analyzed with emphasis upon its conceptual underpinnings, rather than
upon the specific language of its reasonable investor standard, a somewhat
more manageable conception of the proper focus of the materiality inquiry
emerges.
A basic predicate of the TSC Industries decision was its implicit recog-
nition that there is a broad range of facts with varying degrees of relevance
to the transaction for which approval by proxy is sought.7 2 The crux of
the court's opinion was that a proper standard of materiality would effectuate
a balance between the shareholders' right to be appraised of these relevant
facts and the danger that dissemination of too much information would
result in more confusion than clarity. 73 This rationale has led the Court to
suggest that in determining whether a substantial likelihood exists that a
71. See id. at 1069. Alternative approaches to defining materiality have been
undertaken. One approach, suggested in a rule 10b-5 case, would find that a fact is
material if its disclosure would cause a fluctuation in the market price of a corpora-
tion's securities. See SEC v. Texas Gulph Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Although this test provides some degree of
certainty, its underlying assumption that the market will react to the disclosure of all
material facts is fallacious, rendering its utility as a test for materiality de minimis..
However, application of this test may be justified where liability is sought to be
imposed under rule lob-5 for nondisclosure by insiders. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§
1303(a)- 1303(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
A more promising approach, proposed in a case involving section 11 of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), would measure materiality in terms of whether
a particular fact would actually be considered important by a specified percentage of a
corporation's shareholders. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (dictum). This percentage would vary according to the dis-
closure required by the relevant regulatory provision. Id. Such a formulation might
provide management with somewhat ascertainable standards upon which it could rely
in initially determining its disclosure obligation and would remove much of the jurys
discretionary power to make a determination as to materiality. Indeed, Judge Wein-
stein's decision in Feit found that a mathematical measure of materiality would afford
a measure of certainty to litigants by permitting the application of "mathematical
models buttressed by valid sampling techniques" to the quantitative results of surveys
in the securities markets. Id. In a similar vein, Professor Kripke has maintained that
a more reliable conception of materiality can be developed by examining the work of
behavioral scientists, economists, and statisticians. Kripke, supra note 70, at 1066-67.
However, the instant decision cannot be faulted for failing to adopt a statistical
approach to materiality, since it is highly unlikely that the judicial power to construe
the meaning of statutes and administrative rules can be read so broadly as to encom-
pass a power to draw the kind of fixed lines which such an approach would necessitate.
72. The Court indicated that there is a range of relevance extending from facts
of "dubious significance," 96 S. Ct. at 2132, to facts of "obvious importance." Id. at
2135 n.15.
73. At one point, the Court directly indicated that it perceived the choice among
various standards of materiality as involving a balancing process. It asserted that
an adequate definition of materiality depends upon "the proper balance between the
need to insure adequate disclosure [of information] and the need to avoid the adverse
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fact would be considered important by a reasonable investor, it is important
not only to examine the significance of that fact standing by itself, but also
to focus upon all of the relevant informationj 4 Where disclosure of the
fact in question would not "substantially alter" this "total mix" of available
information, the fact may not be deemed material3 5 Hence, in considering
whether a particular fact is material, it will be incumbent upon the courts
and members of corporate management to explore the entire range of facts
having any bearing upon the transaction. By viewing the qualitative and
quantitative aspects of this information as a whole, the relative importance
of any particular fact, and hence its materiality, emerges more clearly than
would be the case if the question were approached merely by focusing upon
the abstract importance of the fact itself.
The obvious import of the TSC Industries decision is its resolution
of a manifest conflict between the circuits as to the proper definition
of materiality for the purposes of rule 14a-9Y In its broader ramifica-
tions, however, the Court's decision can be expected to eliminate similar
inter-circuit conflicts as to the meaning of the term "material", in other
areas of the securities laws where that concept is significant. 7 Although
the Supreme Court's test of materiality was limited to cases arising under
section 14(a),78 the probability exists that this formulation will be applied
by the courts to each of the antifraud provisions of the securities lawsJ 9
If the courts seek to expand application of the TSC Industries formulation
of materiality, however, they should do so with recognition of the fact that
the TSC Industries standard was developed specifically within the proxy
solicitation context,8 0 and that it may not be desireable, as a policy matter,
to apply this standard to other areas of federal securities regulation. As
has been frequently recognized, the various sections of the securities laws
74. See 96 S. Ct. at 2132-33.
75. Id. at 2133 (emphasis added).
76. While such a resolution has the salutary effect of providing certainty as to
the proper definition of materiality, the utility of the standard to courts, attorneys,
litigants, and corporate management is likely to be de minimis unless the standard
is applied with explicit recognition of the logic underlying its development. See notes
67-75 and accompanying text supra. Unless such a scrupulous application is developed,
the only possible value of the Court's resolution of the inter-circuit conflict over
materiality will be to afford the defendant in a rule 14a-9 case a slightly more favorable
jury instruction. See note 34 supra.
77. For a discussion of the varied formulations of materiality which have been
employed in various circuits with respect to different sections of the federal securities
laws, see notes 25-27 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
78. Id. at 2132. For the text of section 14(a), see note 8 supra.
79. Strong support for this conclusion lies in the fact that, to support its own
formulation, the Court cited cases which had defined materiality for purposes of vir-
tually all of the antifraud sections of the securities laws. Id. at 2132 n.3. Moreover,
in the past, most of the decisions which had considered a definition of materiality in
areas other than section 14 (a) had looked to Mills, a section 14(a) case, to support
their definitions. This practice cannot reasonably be expected to change. For an
overview of the cases basing a definition of materiality upon Mills, see note 30 supra.
80. Indeed, the Court limited its consideration of materiality to rule 14a-9. See
96 S. Ct. at 2128, 2132.
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require different amounts of disclosure in different contexts to effectuate
different policies. 8 ' Hence, materiality, as a key measure of the factual
disclosure obligation,8 2 may need to be measured by a test of greater or
lesser stringency than the TSC Industries standard, depending upon the
context in which the concept is sought to be applied.
83
In view of these problems, the proper formulation of a standard of
materiality for each of the other areas of the federal securities laws should
seek to incorporate the underlying rationale of TSC Industries rather than
necessarily adopting the explicit language of its "substantial likelihood"
test. In seeking to expand the application of TSC Industries, the courts
should require disclosure of a fact in a particular context upon a showing
that its degree of relevance to a transaction overbalances the risk that dis-
closure in that context would defeat, rather than further, the purpose and
policy of the rule which itself requires disclosure in that context.
8 4
The Supreme Court's consideration of materiality in TSC Industries
has provided a clear definition of the meaning of this important concept
for purposes of rule 14a-9.8 5 However, the utility of the Court's standard is
81. Compare, e.g., Securities Act, § 10 and Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, aa
(1970), with Exchange Act, § 10(b), id. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1976).
It has been suggested that there are basically four different contexts in which
the securities laws require disclosure of material information and that the concept
of materiality must be measured by reference to these contexts and the purposes for
which the disclosure is required. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 68, at § 9.21(2) (a).
As set out by Bloomenthal, these contexts include:
(1) false or misleading statements in registration statements and other documents
filed with the Commission; (2) false or misleading statements made by the seller
of securities in face-to-face transactions outside of formal disclosure documents;
(3) false or misleading statements made in unstructured disclosures rather than
as part of a filing by one not purchasing or selling securities; and (4) the absence
of disclosure in a context in which a party has a duty to disclose. Each of these
categories may have subdivisions - for example, filed documents include not only
'33 and '34 Act registration statements and '34 Act reports but proxy and tender
offer statements. The nondisclosure category can include nondisclosure in the
absence of insider trading or during a period of time in which insiders are trading.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Bloomenthal goes on to state: "It does not necessarily follow
that the concept of materiality differs in each of the situations described, but appro-
priate analysis would suggest that any attempt to generalize the concept be measured
against its possible application in each context." Id.
82. See note 16 supra.
83. See note 81 supra.
84. The Court itself suggested that it used a balancing analysis as a rationale
supporting its articulation of the "substantial likelihood" test. See note 73 supra.
Moreover, the Court's opinion clearly suggests that there were three essential elements
to be weighed in this balancing process: the context in which disclosure is required;
the policy behind requiring disclosure in that context; and the relative importance of
the continuum of facts relevant to the transaction at issue. For a discussion of these
factors and the Court's analysis thereof, see notes 41-45 & 72-75 and accompanying
text supra.
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likely to be undermined unless its application is undertaken only with refer-
ence to the thoughtful policy analysis underlying its development. s 6 Careful
scrutiny of the rationale supporting the Court's decision is especially im-
portant in determining to what extent the TSC Industries standard should
be extended to other areas of the federal securities laws.
8 7
Michael D. Fishbein
86. See notes 67-75 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 77-84 and accompanying text supra.
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